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CHOOSING BETWEEN HEALTHCARE AND A GREEN CARD: 
THE COST OF PUBLIC CHARGE 
ABSTRACT 
Public charge policy has been part of the nation’s infrastructure since its 
colonial beginnings. The policy originated as a barrier to protect taxpayers from 
individuals who posed a risk of becoming a charge on society, relying on public 
aid and governmental support. Congress last addressed the public charge 
statute in 1952 in the Immigration and Nationality Act, and it has been further 
developed at the will of the executive branch alongside the growth of 
immigration law and the welfare state. The Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) proposed a rule change to the public charge policy to be implemented in 
October 2019, but the proposed rule change was temporarily halted by federal 
courts days before it went into effect, partially because it threatened public 
health and posed an extreme financial burden to healthcare centers. On 
January 27, 2020, the Supreme Court stayed the lower court’s injunction in 
response to an emergency petition by the administration, effectively voiding the 
ban in forty-nine states and allowing the 2019 public charge policy to take effect 
while the issue is litigated in lower courts. The rule went into effect on 
February 24, 2020, a mere month prior to the onslaught of the COVID-19 
outbreak in the United States. On July 29, 2020, DHS was enjoined from 
implementing the 2019 public charge policy for the duration of the national 
health emergency in response to the pandemic. 
Public charge policy has fallen to the discretion of the executive branch in 
recent decades, and the last major policy guidance was issued in 1999. Congress 
did not overrule the executive agency in 1999, in a way signaling acceptance of 
the policy trend at the turn of the millennium; however, the 2019 rule change 
executed by DHS derails the agency’s prior interpretation significantly. Public 
charge policy has historically been used by the federal government to 
discriminate, and it continues to be used as a political tool to exclude racial and 
ethnic minorities from accessing public health benefits. In burdening these 
minorities, the government in turn burdens the healthcare system. Without 
congressional action, the fate of public charge is decidedly unclear and the 
confusion and fear for noncitizens fueled by the 2019 rule will not abate. This 
Comment proposes that Congress revise the public charge statute to address 
concerns raised by the 2019 rule, at minimum ensuring that access to legally 
entitled health benefits are excluded from public charge consideration. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Statue of Liberty stands in welcome on the shores of the United States 
and declares, “[g]ive me your tired, your poor, [y]our huddled masses yearning 
to breathe free,”1 as a promise from the United States to honor and support 
immigrants in their endeavors. The ebb and flow of immigration along with the 
skyrocketing cost of healthcare combine to create significant controversy. As a 
result, immigration, health care, and the economy are the crux of American 
politics2 and are prominent items on the agenda for the Trump Administration.3 
At the intersection of these three platforms is public charge policy: a practice 
which determines admission of noncitizens into the United States based on the 
noncitizen’s likelihood of dependence on the federal government’s public 
services.4 From the first mention of public charge in our earliest immigration 
laws to the welfare reform legislation passed in the late twentieth century, public 
charge policy consistently centered around a dual commitment to enabling entry 
to noncitizens contributing to the economy and “a commitment to assist 
members of the community who fall on hard times.”5 In 2018, the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS) reflected the Trump Administration’s political 
interests, following leaks that DHS planned to change the public charge rule, by 
substantially expanding the application of public charge inadmissibility6 and 
departing from the dual commitment they had balanced for over a century.7 The 
2019 changes include consideration of a noncitizen’s previous use of public 
benefits that were excluded from the policy at the time, such as the subsidization 
of health care, and recognition of five distinct “heavily weighed” negative 
factors for the inadmissibility test, that will affect hundreds of thousands of 
immigrants in the country.8  
 
 1 Emma Lazarus, The New Colossus, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/stli/learn/historyculture/ 
colossus.htm (last updated Aug. 14, 2019). 
 2 Frank Newport, Top Issues for Voters: Healthcare, Economy, Immigration, GALLUP (Nov. 2, 2018), 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/244367/top-issues-voters-healthcare-economy-immigration.aspx. 
 3 See, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT: A NEW FOUNDATION FOR 
AMERICAN GREATNESS: FISCAL YEAR 2018 15–17 (2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/ 
files/omb/budget/fy2018/budget.pdf. 
 4 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4); Public Charge, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/ 
greencard/public-charge (last updated Mar. 27, 2020). 
 5 Medha D. Makhlouf, The Public Charge Rule as Public Health Policy, 16 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 177, 
179 (2019).  
 6 Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 83 Fed. Reg. 51,114, 51,116 (proposed Oct. 10, 2018) (to 
be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 103, 212, 213, 214, 245, and 248).  
 7 Makhlouf, supra note 5.  
 8 Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 83 Fed. Reg. at 51,173, 51,198 (considering previously 
excluded public benefit programs and labeling “heavily weighed” negative factors); see Deepti Hajela, Lawsuits 
Around U.S. Seek to Block Trump’s Public Charge Rule, PBS (Oct 8, 2019, 4:19 PM), https://www.pbs.org/ 
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A mere four days before the new public charge rule was to take effect, three 
district courts halted the rule nationwide.9 The district courts granted motions to 
stay the effective date of the proposed rule.10 While the temporary delay of the 
proposed change was celebrated by healthcare institutions and immigration 
advocates, the fight drags on both in court and in the daily life of many 
immigrants concerned about their uncertain status.11 On January 27, 2020, the 
Supreme Court granted a stay in response to an emergency petition by the Trump 
Administration, lifting the nationwide injunction and allowing the 2019 public 
charge policy to take effect while legal challenges continue in lower courts.12 
DHS implemented the 2019 final public charge policy nationwide on February 
24, 2020,13 a mere month prior to the onslaught of the COVID-19 outbreak in 
the United States.14 On July 29, 2020, DHS was enjoined from implementing 
the 2019 public charge policy for the duration of the national health emergency 
 
newshour/nation/lawsuits-around-u-s-seek-to-block-trumps-public-charge-rule (noting the 382,000 immigrants 
directly affected by the 2019 policy). 
 9 Priscilla Alvarez, Geneva Sands & Tami Luhby, Three Federal Judges Hit Trump on Immigration 
Policy Changes, CNN (Oct. 11, 2019, 6:07 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/11/politics/green-card-public-
charge-rule-blocked/index.html. 
 10 Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 3, New York v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., No. 1:19-cv-07777-GBD (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2019); Order Granting Plaintiff States’ Motion for 
Section 705 Stay and Preliminary Injunction at 58, Washington v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 4:19-cv-
05210-RMP (E.D. Wash. Oct. 11, 2019); Preliminary Injunction at 92, San Francisco v. U.S. Citizenship & 
Immigration Servs., No. 4:19-cv-04717-PJH (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2019); Preliminary Injunction at 92, La Clinica 
de la Raza v. Trump, No. 19-cv-04980-PJH (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2019); Preliminary Injunction at 92, California 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 19-cv-04975-PJH (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2019) (addressing three related 
actions in one order, with each having moved for preliminary injunctive relief and being granted together).  
 11 See Make the Rd. N.Y. v. Cuccinelli, 419 F. Supp. 3d 647, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (noting that nine 
lawsuits have been filed and cases against the proposed rule are currently being litigated).  
 12 Robert Barnes & Maria Sacchetti, Supreme Court Allows Trump Administration to Proceed with 
‘Wealth Test’ Rules for Immigrants, WASH. POST (Jan. 27, 2020, 6:54 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
politics/courts_law/supreme-court-allows-trump-administration-to-proceed-with-immigration-
rules/2020/01/27/6adb9688-412c-11ea-aa6a-083d01b3ed18_story.html; see also Pete Williams, In 5-4 Ruling, 
Supreme Court Allows Trump Plan to Deny Green Cards to Those Who May Need Government Aid, NBC NEWS 
(Jan. 27, 2020, 3:55 PM)), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/supreme-court/5-4-ruling-supreme-court-allows-
trump-plan-deny-green-n1124056. The Supreme Court denied requests to temporarily block the government 
from enforcing the 2019 public charge rule during the COVID-19 pandemic, discouraging immigrants from 
receiving testing and treatment through public health programs to which they are legally entitled. Amy Howe, 
No Pause from Supreme Court for “Public Charge” Rule During COVID-19 Pandemic, SCOTUSBLOG 
(Apr. 24, 2020, 8:30 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/04/no-pause-from-supreme-court-for-public-
charge-rule-during-covid-19-pandemic/. 
 13 Public Charge, supra note 4. Illinois was protected by an injunction issued in a separate case, which 
was lifted on February 21, 2020. Barnes & Sacchetti, supra note 12; Supreme Court Lifts Illinois Injunction on 
Public Charge Rule, Allowing Nationwide Implementation, NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL. (Mar. 2, 2020), 
https://nlihc.org/resource/supreme-court-lifts-illinois-injunction-public-charge-rule-allowing-nationwide. 
 14 Proclamation on Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Novel Coronavirus Disease 
(COVID-19) Outbreak, WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/ 
proclamation-declaring-national-emergency-concerning-novel-coronavirus-disease-covid-19-outbreak/. 
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in response to the pandemic.15 Although the new policy is temporarily halted, 
the public charge statute has gone unaddressed by Congress for decades, and the 
most marginalized in society are falling through the gap.  
This Comment argues that public charge policy has systematically been 
weaponized to intimidate noncitizens by taking a policy intended to protect 
American citizens and instead using it as a cover to further political bias and 
discourage immigrants from accessing public benefits to which they are legally 
entitled. This weaponization will inevitably increase the burden on taxpayers 
and businesses, namely healthcare centers, to support noncitizens further down 
the line. This Comment assembles data provided by healthcare institutions in the 
underlying litigation over the public charge policy. It also calls upon Congress 
to address the inconsistency between the 1996 welfare reform and the 2019 
public charge policy regarding public health programs, revisit the public charge 
statute, and consider a limited, yet significant revision of the legislation to 
exclude government-funded health benefits from public charge inadmissibility 
consideration. Although the administrative law issues of the 2019 public charge 
rule are being litigated, this Comment focuses on the systemic problem of 
conflating public charge policy with access to healthcare, urging Congress to 
rethink this connection between immigration and the provision of healthcare 
entirely. Part I uncovers the background of public charge policy, including the 
legislative history and legal context of its evolution. Part II addresses the feared 
implications of the 2019 rule as a prime example of the misuse of the public 
charge policy. Part III argues that the development of public charge has been 
weaponized as a political tool of the federal administration at the expense of 
taxpayers and healthcare systems. Part IV prescribes specific congressional 
action to revise the public charge statute to exclude consideration of legally 
entitled health benefits.  
I. BACKGROUND OF PUBLIC CHARGE POLICY 
The public charge policy of today reflects centuries of evolving immigration 
law, political bias, and the rise and fall of the welfare state. Upon close analysis 
of the overall development of public charge policy from the early colonial period 
through the late twentieth century, the danger of an unrevised statute becomes 
undeniably clear. With unrelenting anti-immigrant propaganda and political 
fears of an ever-growing welfare agenda, current public charge policy has been 
warped to be unidentifiable from where it began. This Part connects the modern 
trend of public charge policy to its roots in immigration law, distinguishes the 
 
 15 Public Charge, supra note 4. 
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methods of inadmissibility and deportation under public charge policy, 
highlights the history of bias hidden behind public charge policy, and discusses 
the development of public charge with the rise and fall of the welfare state.  
A. Roots of Public Charge Policy in Immigration Law  
Public charge policy first appeared as early as the first colonies, which 
adopted “poor laws” recognizing claims for relief from colonists on a local, 
township basis.16 State immigration laws arose from these early colonial 
constructs, and, as the flow of impoverished immigrants seeking refuge from the 
Irish famine came to a peak in 1847, the Board of Commissioners for Emigration 
in New York prohibited the arrival of people who were “likely to become 
permanently a public charge.”17 State laws such as this one were the foundation 
for the nation’s first general immigration law in 1882, the Immigration Act, 
which prohibited the arrival on land of “any person unable to take care of himself 
or herself without becoming a public charge.”18  
Between 1880 and 1920 the United States welcomed over twenty million 
immigrants as it entered a period of industrialization and urbanization.19 Over 
the same period, the federal government passed five immigration laws that 
provided a framework for the exclusion and deportation of immigrants. Less 
than a decade after the first general immigration law, Congress passed the 
Immigration Act of 1891 which expanded inadmissibility of immigrants to not 
only those who are currently deemed a public charge but also “persons likely to 
become a public charge.”20 The expansion in this Act also included a deportation 
policy aimed at immigrants who had entered the United States within one year 
prior to becoming a public charge, placing the cost burden for a return ticket on 
 
 16 Ibrahim Hirsi, Trump Administration’s ‘Public Charge’ Provision Has Roots in Colonial US, WORLD 
(Dec. 19, 2018, 2:00 PM), https://www.pri.org/stories/2018-12-19/trump-administration-s-public-charge-provision-
has-roots-colonial-us. These poor laws allowed towns to “expel transient beggars” and limited the arrival of 
disabled people and those deemed unable to financially support themselves by not allowing them to disembark 
from arriving ships and returning them to their countries of origin. TORRIE HESTER, HIDETAKA HIROTA, MARY 
E. MENDOZA, DIERDRE MOLONEY, MAE NGAI, LUCY SALYER & ELLIOTT YOUNG, HISTORIANS’ COMMENT: DHS 
NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULE “INADMISSIBILITY ON PUBLIC CHARGE GROUNDS” 2 (2018).  
 17 ORG. OF THE COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE COMMISSIONERS OF EMIGRATION OF THE STATE OF 
NEW YORK: FROM THE ORGANIZATION OF COMMISSION, app. at 2 (1861). Massachusetts built upon the expulsion 
factor of earlier colonial laws and established an immigrant deportation law reflecting anti-Irish sentiment in the 
state at the time. See GEN. CT. OF MASS., An Act Relating to Alien Passengers, in ACTS AND RESOLVES PASSED 
BY THE GENERAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS 338–39 (Dutton & Wentworth 1850). 
 18 An Act to Regulate Immigration, ch. 376, § 2, 22 Stat. 214 (1882).  
 19 See U.S. Immigration Before 1965, HISTORY, https://www.history.com/topics/immigration/u-s-
immigration-before-1965 (last updated May 16, 2019). 
 20 Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551 § 1, 26 Stat. 1084 (1891).  
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the steamship company that facilitated their original arrival.21 Immigrants 
outside of the scrutinized one-year time frame, who had been integrated into 
local communities and had often begun their families in the United States, were 
not subject to deportation under this public charge provision.22 The following 
three immigration laws, passed in 1903, 1907, and finally 1917, gradually 
expanded the scrutinized time frame within which a recent immigrant was 
eligible for deportation from the original one-year trial period to a total of five 
years, where the law still currently stands.23 The parameters for deportation 
reflected those for inadmissibility, in theory allowing the government to expel a 
person who had been incorrectly allowed access to the United States and would 
have otherwise been deemed a public charge prior to their entry—allowing 
flexibility for those who came across hardships after settling in the United 
States.24  
Public charge in these original laws, from colonial authorizations to the 
nation’s early immigration acts, necessarily qualified those who were dependent 
on public aid and benefit programs for the “basic maintenance of their lives”25 
prior to their entry into the United States, a definition that has evolved 
substantially since the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.26 For context, 
the United States granted entry to an average of one million people per year from 
1905 to 1914; in 1916, the Immigration Bureau deemed 10,263—roughly 1% of 
arrivals—inadmissible on public charge grounds and deported 1,431 recent 
immigrants—roughly 1% of that number—under the same parameters.27 The 
use of public healthcare programs was not considered to qualify an immigrant 
as a public charge in cases of deportability because, until the 1960s, there were 
no federally funded public health programs.28 Instead, hospital expenses for new 
 
 21 Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551 § 11, 26 Stat. 1086 (1891). 
 22 HESTER ET AL., supra note 16.  
 23 Act of Mar. 3, 1903, ch. 1012 § 20, 32 Stat. 1218 (1903); Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134 § 20, 34 Stat. 
898, 904–05 (1907); Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29 § 19, 39 Stat. 874, 889 (1917); see also E. P. HUTCHINSON, 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY 1798–1965, at 133 (1981) (explaining legislative 
developments of the Act of Mar. 3, 1903); Alina Das, The Immigration Penalties of Criminal Convictions: 
Resurrecting Categorical Analysis in Immigration Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669, 1689 (2011) (providing an 
overview of expansion of deportations relating to convictions).  
 24 See § 11, 26 Stat. 1086. 
 25 HESTER ET AL., supra note 16, at 3. 
 26 See IMMIGR. SERV., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER-GENERAL OF IMMIGRATION TO THE 
SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1897, at 4 (1897) (framing early federal 
deportations as a means of institutional removal).  
 27 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER GENERAL OF IMMIGRATION 12 (1916); 
HESTER ET AL., supra note 16, at 3. 
 28 See COMM. ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF UNINSURANCE, HEALTH INSURANCE IS A FAMILY MATTER 153 
(2002). 
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immigrants were paid either by the steamship companies that originally 
transported them or by an “immigrant fund,” labeling them public charges under 
“temporary distress” that were effectively rehabilitated by the government.29 
Early application and interpretation of public charge limited deportability on the 
basis of public charge and focused inadmissibility on the reliance on public aid, 
forming the foundation for the development of the policy in the future. As this 
Comment discusses, the concept of relying on public aid for the “basic 
maintenance”30 of living in the United States has changed considerably in the 
last century, and restricting access to public health benefits to which immigrants 
are now legally entitled does not honor the purpose of public charge policy.31  
B. Inadmissibility Versus Deportation in Public Charge 
Public charge assessment rears its head in two phases: (1) upon application 
and admission into the United States and (2) within five years following the time 
of entry.32 Since the early twentieth century, federal immigration statutes have 
clearly distinguished between public charge inadmissibility and public charge 
deportation, giving the latter a significantly stricter test.33 The argument follows 
a basic understanding of sovereignty: the state is within its rights to exclude a 
person who has never entered the country, whereas dislodging a person from 
their home after they have integrated into the community presents higher 
stakes.34 The stricter standard for this test limits discriminatory enforcement of 
the clause, and there is an underlying recognition that allowing immigrants to 
access public benefits would better integrate them into the community.35 
However, “undesirable” immigrants who were unhealthy or disabled—
 
 29 IMMIGR. SERV., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER-GENERAL OF IMMIGRATION TO THE 
SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1896, at 10 (1896) (describing how 1,946 
immigrants fell into temporary distress and became public charges from causes arising within 1 year of entry, 
but were not returned to their country of origin). 
 30 HESTER ET AL., supra note 16, at 3. 
 31 See Robert A. Moffitt, The Deserving Poor, the Family, and the U.S. Welfare System, 52 DEMOGRAPHY 
729, 730–34 (2015).  
 32 The Public Charge Rule, Explained, BOUNDLESS (Feb. 24, 2020), https://www.boundless.com/blog/ 
public-charge-rule-explained/.  
 33 In re Harutunian, 14 I. & N. Dec. 583, 587–88 (B.I.A. 1974). 
 34 See id. at 585–86. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) established a three-part test to determine 
deportability: (1) the state must charge the immigrant for services rendered by public benefit programs, (2) the 
state must demand payment from the person liable under the state’s law, and (3) there must be a failure to pay 
for the service charges. CONG. RSCH. SERV., PUBLIC CHARGE GROUNDS OF INADMISSIBILITY AND 
DEPORTABILITY: LEGAL OVERVIEW 4 (2017).  
 35 See Leo M. Alpert, The Alien and the Public Charge Clauses, 49 YALE L.J. 18, 26–28 (1939) 
(describing court cases where, although warranted, the public charge deportability provision was not applied or 
was suspended for noncitizen families who were supported by welfare based on principles of promoting 
integration). 
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particularly mentally disabled—have a history of being deported under the 
public charge rule.36 In 1926, 887 noncitizens were deported because they were 
“likely to become a public charge,” out of almost 11,000 total deportations that 
year.37 
In contrast, inadmissibility is determined by the Board of Immigration 
Appeals on the much broader “totality of the circumstances” test, including a 
variety of factors ranging from “age, health, family status, assets, resources, 
financial status, education, and skills.”38 The Immigration and Nationality Act 
of 1952 expanded inadmissibility to extend beyond those attempting to 
temporarily enter the United States from abroad on a visa or green card to 
include immigrants already within the United States who were now seeking to 
become permanent residents.39 Prior to 1952, temporary visitors seeking to 
become permanent residents first had to leave the country, apply through a U.S. 
consulate abroad, and face the inadmissibility test again as a prospective 
permanent resident.40 Now, although an immigrant could apply to adjust their 
status without exiting the country, the totality of circumstances test includes 
circumstances that occurred while the immigrant was residing in the United 
States on a temporary basis.41  
Although inadmissibility was intended to be a forward-looking test,42 the 
scope shifted as the categories for entry into the United States continued to grow. 
 
 36 Polly J. Price, Infecting the Body Politic: Observations on Health Security and the ‘Undesirable’ 
Immigrant, 63 U. KAN. L. REV. 917, 941 (2015). 
 37 Id.  
 38 EM PUHL, TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES: ASSESSING THE PUBLIC CHARGE GROUND OF 
INADMISSIBILITY 2 (2019); see Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 2 § 212(a), 66 Stat. 163, 189 
(describing the classes of noncitizens ineligible for visas to be excluded from admission into the United States); 
see also In re Perez, 15 I. & N. Dec. 136, 137 (B.I.A. 1974) (“The determination of whether an alien is likely to 
become a public charge . . . is a prediction based upon the totality of the alien’s circumstances[.]”).  
 39 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 2 § 214, 66 Stat. 163, 189. The Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1952 created “nonimmigrant” categories for temporary entry into the United States to visit, 
work, or study. Id.; see also USCIS Policy Manual, Volume 7, Part A, Adjustment of Status Policies and 
Procedures, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-7-part-a-
chapter-1 (last updated May 21, 2020) [hereinafter USCIS Policy Manual] (summarizing the impact of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952).  
 40 See USCIS Policy Manual, supra note 39.  
 41 Id.; see In re Harutunian, 14 I. & N. Dec. 583, 589 (B.I.A. 1974) (“It is a well established fact that an 
applicant for adjustment of status . . . is in the same posture as though he were an applicant before an American 
consular officer abroad[.]”); see also President Donald J. Trump Is Ensuring Non-Citizens Do Not Abuse Our 
Nation’s Public Benefit, WHITE HOUSE (Aug. 12, 2019) [hereinafter Trump’s Statement on the 2019 Rule 
Change], https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-ensuring-non-citizens-
not-abuse-nations-public-benefit/ (“Aliens in the United States who are found likely to become public charges 
will also be barred from adjusting their immigration status.”). 
 42 Makhlouf, supra note 5, at 185 (“Inadmissibility . . . is concerned with whether a noncitizen is ‘likely 
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Current law allows the public charge inadmissibility test to be applied at three 
distinct times in an immigrant’s integration into the country: when they (1) apply 
for a visa to travel to the United States, (2) arrive at a port of entry, and (3) apply 
for lawful permanent resident status.43 This Comment focuses on immigrants 
seeking the third point of integration and highlights the danger posed to those 
applying for permanent resident status, and consequently to healthcare centers 
and state governments, by the new restriction on public health benefits. The 
development of inadmissibility and deportation policy under the public charge 
rule exposes the room left for discrimination in the application of the statute, as 
the two facets were manipulated throughout the twentieth century.  
C. Battling Bias in Public Charge in the Twentieth Century  
The “likely to become a public charge” language44 originally allowed for 
irregular enforcement of inadmissibility, subject to the biases of immigration 
agents reviewing cases. This irregular enforcement is mirrored in the 2019 
public charge policy, which targets “undesirable” immigrants by expanding 
public charge considerations to include the access of public health benefits.45  
The public charge rule has historically been utilized as a tool for 
discriminatory exclusion. When immigrants were arriving on Ellis Island, the 
public charge policy gave immigration officials broad latitude to determine the 
potential to become a public charge, to the point that one immigration 
commissioner demanded that Southern and Eastern Europeans arriving on the 
shores have $25 in cash alongside a ticket to their final destination.46 If the 
migrants, many of whom were Jewish, did not have the money or the ticket, they 
were excluded and summarily deported.47 Public charge has been notoriously, 
unevenly applied in its history and was hardly enforced until the Great 
Depression, when concerns regarding the burden of migrants in civil society 
peaked.48 The disparity was especially apparent considering the treatment of 
European migrants compared to Mexican and African migrants; although 
European migrants relied heavily on a range of federal public benefits, they were 
 
to become a public charge at some future time.’”). 
 43 Id. at 177. 
 44 The Public Charge Rule, Explained, supra note 32. 
 45 See infra Part III.A. This Comment drives home how this discrimination exacerbates costs for hospitals 
who offer uncompensated care to immigrants too afraid to access public health programs. See infra Part III.B.  
 46 Public Charge Rule Has History of ‘Racial Exclusion’ Says Immigration Historian, WORLD (Aug. 14, 
2019, 5:00 PM), https://www.pri.org/stories/2019-08-14/public-charge-rule-has-history-racial-exclusion-says-
immigration-historian. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
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not stigmatized for doing so and were able to access emergency relief services, 
social services, and aid for children.49 Mexican migrants were severely penalized 
for attempting to rely on the same programs, and local governments turned their 
efforts to mass expulsion of stigmatized migrants during the Great Depression.50 
Immigration historians note that the term ‘likely to become a public charge’ has 
“always been used as a cover for more racially discriminatory immigration 
restrictions” and a desperate effort to restrict the entry of diverse migrants.51  
Immigration officials had discretion to couple factors that were not, on their 
own, grounds for exclusion under public charge in making cases for 
inadmissibility.52 Desirability of immigrants in the workforce also affected the 
characterization of who was likely to become a public charge; those who were 
expected to provide cheap labor were welcomed into the country, whereas those 
who fit the bias of incurring high social welfare costs were barred from entry.53 
Bias from immigration officials unfairly targeted women seeking to enter the 
United States on their own, denying that women were capable of being self-
supporting and independent in the economy.54 Limiting the entry of immigrant 
women into the United States also played a significant political role, as there 
was mounting fear of a fast-growing population of children of recent immigrants 
that could pose a “social problem” to the nationalist tendencies of the time.55 
Historian Wendy Kline described a white middle class that was in jeopardy, 
faced with the social and economic change posed by a growing population of 
working-class immigrants.56 Racially and ethnically marginalized groups were 
also often deemed economically unfit and doomed to become public charges,57 
such as Jewish “peddlers”58 and “unclean[]” Indians in the early twentieth 
 
 49 Id.  
 50 ABRAHAM HOFFMAN, UNWANTED MEXICAN AMERICANS IN THE GREAT DEPRESSION: REPATRIATION 
PRESSURES, 1929–1939, at xiii (1974); see DEIRDRE MOLONEY, NATIONAL INSECURITIES: IMMIGRANTS AND U.S. 
DEPORTATION POLICY SINCE 1882, at 87, 92 (2012) (describing the Mexicans, including children born in the 
United States, that were repatriated in the 1930s); see also Public Charge Rule Has History of ‘Racial Exclusion,’ 
Says Immigration Historian, supra note 46 (“[M]any local governments used this dependence on relief to launch 
one of the greatest mass expulsions of Mexican and Mexican Americans during the Great Depression.”). 
 51 Public Charge Rule Has History of ‘Racial Exclusion,’ Says Immigration Historian, supra note 46.  
 52 See HESTER ET AL., supra note 16, at 3. 
 53 LISA PARK, ENTITLED TO NOTHING: THE STRUGGLE FOR IMMIGRANT HEALTH CARE IN THE AGE OF 
WELFARE REFORM 57 (2011).  
 54 MOLONEY, supra note 50, at 79–80; see also PARK, supra note 53 (explaining the perception of a 
woman’s role as “naturally” dependent and subordinate). 
 55 See Park, supra note 53, at 55. 
 56 WENDY KLINE, BUILDING A BETTER RACE: GENDER, SEXUALITY, AND EUGENICS FROM THE TURN OF 
THE CENTURY TO THE BABY BOOM 9, 14 (2001).  
 57 MOLONEY, supra note 50, at 79–80. 
 58 Id. at 83, 87 (noting that the stereotype was used to exclude Jewish immigrants from 1910s to 1940s).  
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century.59 To limit these personal and institutional biases, quantifiable standards 
were established to determine if someone was likely to become a public charge, 
which continue to guide the policy today.60  
In contrast to inadmissibility, the public charge standard for deportability 
looked for a pattern of public aid dependence in recent immigrants, in which 
they became “completely dependent on public facilities,” such as hospitals, for 
support.61 However, if the cause for hospitalization did not exist before an 
immigrant was admitted to the United States, they were not in danger of 
deportation as a result of becoming a public charge. This distinction was 
intended to protect immigrants who relied on public support for a hospital stay 
after breaking their leg, in contrast to an immigrant who had been diagnosed 
with a long-term and debilitating illness prior to their entry, in which case they 
would be denied entry.62 The intended purpose of public health programs, which 
subsidized healthcare in the twentieth century (other than for long-term 
institutional care), was not to support immigrants financially but rather to 
supplement and integrate these new community members.63 Biases began to 
arise as new social support programs, such as English classes, were 
implemented, and enforcement of the general deportation policy was abused 
similarly to the inadmissibility policy.64 Regional economic downturns in the 
1920s and the Great Depression in the 1930s led local authorities to deport 
employed immigrants, specifically hundreds of thousands of Mexican workers 
and their families, on the feeble grounds that they had utilized some city or 
county public benefits, even though they were not in danger of becoming 
completely dependent on public facilities for support.65  
 
 59 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, REPORTS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR: 1914, at 438–39 (1914) (including 
instruction from the head of the Bureau of Immigration to exclude people from India because they were 
“unclean[]” and were therefore unemployable). 
 60 Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform, ch. 15 § 1182(a), 4 Stat. 706, 711 (2018); cf. An 
Act to Prohibit the Importation and Migration of Foreigners and Aliens Under Contract or Agreement to Perform 
Labor in the United States, its Territories, and the District of Columbia, ch. 164 § 1, 23 Stat. 332 (1885).  
 61 HESTER ET AL., supra note 16, at 4; see also Price, supra note 36, at 938 (“Beginning in the twentieth 
century, state governments played a limited role in mental health-based exclusions for immigrants, and this role 
was primarily to identify non-citizens for deportation on the ground that they had become a ‘public charge.’”). 
 62 See HESTER ET AL., supra note 16, at 4; Price, supra note 36, at 938 (“[I]t became a common practice 
for state health agencies and hospitals—especially mental health institutions—to engineer the deportation of any 
non-citizen who had become a public charge or who had spent even a small amount of time in a mental 
institution.”).  
 63 Makhlouf, supra note 5, at 182. 
 64 See id.; MOLONEY, supra note 50, at 142. 
 65 Id. at 88, 92. 
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In contrast, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) claimed that 
it did not consider immigrants who were suffering and receiving public relief as 
“victims of the general economic depression” subject to deportation.66 Whereas 
Mexican immigrants were extrajudicially escorted out of the country by local 
authorities for using meager county benefits,67 INS tempered its use of public 
charge to deport new immigrants, primarily benefiting Europeans and Canadians 
in the early 1930s.68 Women faced intensified scrutiny as well, as the federal 
government used ‘likely to become a public charge’ language to deport them in 
cases of petty sexual misconduct after they arrived in the United States.69 Federal 
cases moved on to eliminate criminal misconduct from being considered for 
public charge deportation, with Judge Learned Hand clarifying that the public 
charge policy referred to “dependency not delinquency” and likening 
deportation to exile and a “dreadful punishment” for crimes that were not 
deportable offenses.70 The public charge statute has a history of being 
manipulated and stretched to reflect the political biases of the time, in effect 
unfairly targeting immigrants perceived undesirable by the government. 
D. National Expansion of Public Benefits Versus Public Charge 
As the nation began to develop a stronger welfare institution, anti-immigrant 
sentiment fueled fears of the welfare state being spread too thin to accommodate 
incoming noncitizens.71 Public charge policy was consequentially being 
developed both alongside and as a response to the growth of the welfare state. 
Beginning with the Social Security Act of 1935, federal and state governments 
began to administer large-scale welfare support through public benefit 
programs.72 This section first discusses the rise of federal welfare support for 
citizens and immigrants, beginning in the 1930s and continuing through the 
1990s. Then it addresses the response from state welfare programs reacting to 
gaps left by the federal government following welfare reform and the 
development of public charge in the years following to ensure access to certain 
 
 66 MAE NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA 72 
(2004). 
 67 MOLONEY, supra note 50, at 88, 92. 
 68 Mae Ngai, The Strange Career of the Illegal Alien: Immigration Restriction and Deportation Policy in 
the United States, 1921–1965, 21 LAW & HIST. REV. 69, 96 (2003). The deportation of Europeans and Canadians 
under public charge dropped from a high of nearly 2,000 in 1924 to fewer than 500 in 1932. Id.  
 69 Id. at 94.  
 70 Id. at 96.  
 71 See Act of Nov. 6, 1986, Pub. L. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359; Makhlouf, supra note 5, at 186. 
 72 See, e.g., Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531 § 1, 49 Stat. 620; see also Makhlouf, supra note 5, at 
183 (describing welfare as “federal programs to provide need-based income support . . . to . . . the deserving 
poor”). 
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non-cash benefits to eligible immigrants. Finally, this section concludes by 
focusing on the crucial enactment of the Emergency Medical Treatment and 
Labor Act (EMTALA) as it implicates healthcare centers in the recent shift of 
public charge policy.  
1. Development of Federal Welfare Support 
As a result of the Great Depression, the federal government established the 
National Housing Act of 193473 and the U.S. Housing Act of 193774 to provide 
permanent, federally funded housing assistance.75 From the 1960s to the 1970s, 
public benefit programs continued to expand significantly through the federal 
government, which established Medicaid, Medicare, food stamps, Head Start, 
job training programs, and child care for families receiving these welfare 
benefits76 and generally did not differentiate between citizens and noncitizens at 
their conception.77  
At the same time, following the Immigration and Naturalization Act in 1965, 
the United States faced an increase in documented and undocumented 
immigration.78 To reconcile these two expanding areas, Congress initially did 
not exclude lawfully present immigrants and refugees from utilizing public 
benefits.79 The federal government scrutinized undocumented immigrants, 
however, and re-shaped the original public benefits programs from the 1960s to 
exclude the “unauthorized” community.80 Similarly, in the 1970s, Congress 
limited access to federal public benefits, such as Supplemental Security Income 
(SSI),81 Medicaid, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), food 
stamps, and federal unemployment insurance.82  
 
 73 National Housing Act of 1934, ch. 847 § 1, 48 Stat. 1246. 
 74 U.S. Housing Act of 1937, ch. 896 § 1, 50 Stat. 888. 
 75 See Peter M. Carrozzo, A New Deal for the American Mortgage: The Home Owners’ Loan 
Corporation, the National Housing Act and the Birth of the National Mortgage Market, 17 U. MIAMI BUS. L. 
REV. 1, 24, 35–37 (2008).  
 76 Makhlouf, supra note 5, at 183.  
 77 Eligibility for the programs were based on income rather than citizenship. Id. at 186.  
 78 U.S. Immigration Since 1965, HISTORY, https://www.history.com/topics/immigration/us-immigration-
since-1965 (last updated June 7, 2019). 
 79 Cybelle Fox, Unauthorized Welfare: The Origins of Immigrant Status Restrictions in American Social 
Policy, 102 J. AM. HIST. 1051, 1059 (2016). 
 80 Id. 
 81 Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 1614(a)(1)(B)(ii), 86 Stat. 1329, 1471.  
 82 Fox, supra note 79, at 1058–59 (“Between 1935 and 1971 no federal laws barred noncitizens, even 
unauthorized immigrants, from social security benefits, unemployment insurance, [Old Age Assistance], or 
ADC . . . . With the enactment of additional public assistance legislation—creating the food stamp program or 
Medicaid, for example—the same rules applied. Under federal law, both authorized and unauthorized 
immigrants were eligible for these programs on the same basis as citizens.”).  
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In the closing decades of the twentieth century, Congress’s attitude toward 
lawfully present and documented immigrants turned sour, and it passed the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, placing a “five-year bar” before 
new immigrants could access federal public benefits.83 Ten years later, the 
federal government passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), welfare reform legislation that 
significantly altered immigrant access to federally funded public benefits.84 The 
published incentive for this restriction was to “assure that aliens be self-reliant 
in accordance with national immigration policy” and reduce federal spending on 
public benefit programs.85  
The terms “qualified alien” and “non-qualified alien” were born at this time 
to distinguish between immigrants who would be barred from receiving 
federally funded public benefits for a period of five years from the time of 
qualification, from immigrants who would not be eligible to participate at all.86 
This five-year bar reflects the inadmissibility and deportation signposts 
established in early immigration law, giving immigrants five years to establish 
themselves before they could turn to federal assistance. At the time, certain 
benefit programs were unrestricted by immigration status, and federal courts 
rejected challenges to restrict immigrant access to these programs, such as K-12 
education, on grounds of unconstitutional discrimination.87 Services that were 
made available to persons within the United States regardless of immigration 
 
 83 Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359; Makhlouf, supra note 
5, at 187. 
 84 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 8 U.S.C. § 1612. 
 85 H.R. REP. NO. 104-430, at 146 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2105, 2260 
(describing the two main objectives of PRWORA as “to assure that aliens be self-reliant in accordance with 
national immigration policy . . . [and] to remove the incentive for illegal immigration provided by the availability 
of public benefits”). See generally Medha D. Makhlouf, Health Justice for Immigrants, 4 U. PA. J.L. & PUB. 
AFF. 235, 266 (2019) (“Controlling costs is a perennial goal of health care policy and reform efforts, and 
concerns about immigrants burdening the health care system have been the major rationale for restrictionist 
policies. This argument is closely linked with the deterrence rationale, which is based on the idea that restrictive 
benefits laws act as a deterrent to foreigners who would come to the United States for the purpose of accessing 
such benefits, and discourage undocumented immigrants from staying in the United States long-term.”). 
 86 Makhlouf, supra note 5, at 187–88 (citing PRWORA § 401(c)(1)(B), 110 Stat. at 2113 (codified in 42 
U.S.C. § 601)) (“In general, non-qualified aliens are not eligible for federal programs that provide ‘any 
retirement, welfare, health, disability, public or assisted housing, postsecondary education, food assistance, 
unemployment benefit, or any other similar benefit.’”). Non-qualified individuals included temporary visitors, 
as well as undocumented immigrants. See Non-citizens: Eligibility, MACPAC, https://www.macpac.gov/ 
subtopic/noncitizens/ (last visited Sept. 3, 2020) (“Examples of non-qualified aliens include those who are 
unauthorized . . . as well as students and other nonimmigrants who are admitted for a temporary purpose.”); see 
also PRWORA § 401(c)(1)(B), 110 Stat. 2105, 2261 (codified in 42 U.S.C. § 601). 
 87 Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (holding that to exclude undocumented immigrants from public 
schools is unconstitutional and would discriminate against and inevitably condemn an entire demographic).  
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status included emergency medical care, public health programs providing 
support for immunizations and treatment of communicable disease symptoms, 
school breakfast and lunch programs, K-12 public education, and short-term 
non-cash emergency disaster assistance.88 Almost fifteen years after the welfare 
reform legislation that restricted access, the Affordable Care Act attempted to 
address the five-year bar on non-emergency public health insurance for lawfully 
present and qualified immigrants by allowing them to receive health insurance 
exchanges and subsidies; however, undocumented immigrants were still 
excluded from this benefit.89 
2. The Two Paths of State Welfare Support 
States set down two divergent paths as a result of the federal welfare reform 
legislation in 1996. State attempts to deny legal immigrants access to state-
funded public benefits generally did not survive court challenges because these 
laws violated the Equal Protection Clause.90 The federal government, with its 
broad authority over immigration law, is within its power to determine when an 
immigrant may be eligible for federal programs, and states are mandated to 
conform under the Fourteenth Amendment.91 Any challenge or further 
restriction of an immigrant’s right to access public programs is preempted by the 
federal government’s control of immigration law, thus precluding states from 
acting on this subject.92  
However, some states set down a different path and began allocating state 
resources to provide a net to catch immigrants within the five-year bar or who 
are otherwise ineligible, such as undocumented travelers.93 Currently, twenty-
two states have programs that reflect the coverage of Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families (TANF), which replaced AFDC, and aid those who were 
disqualified or deferred for five years as a result of PRWORA,94 fifteen states 
authorize relief for indigent populations without any immigration status 
 
 88 See Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 83 Fed. Reg. 51,114, 51,128, tbl.3 (listing programs 
that are exceptions from the definition of federal public benefit under PRWORA). 
 89 HESTER ET AL., supra note 16, at 6. 
 90 See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) (holding that limiting public assistance to 
immigrants integrated into the community over a long period of time is a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause).  
 91 See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77, 80–81, 84–85 (1976).  
 92 HESTER ET AL., supra note 16, at 7 (citing De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976); LULAC I/II on Ca. 
Prop. 187 (1994); Ariz. Prop. 200 (2004)). 
 93 Id.  
 94 Id. The twenty-two states with such coverage are California, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, 
Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin. Id. at 11 n.33. 
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restrictions,95 five states fund SSI replacement programs,96 and some even go as 
far as to provide non-emergency medical care to undocumented immigrants.97  
3. Development of Public Charge Following PRWORA 
Although Congress did not address public charge in PRWORA, the INS 
redefined public charge in 1999 to accommodate federal restrictions on 
immigrant access to public benefits and mean:  
an alien who has become (for deportation purposes) or who is likely to 
become (for admission or adjustment purposes) ‘primarily dependent 
on the government for subsistence, as demonstrated by either the 
receipt of public cash assistance for income maintenance or 
institutionalization for long-term care at [g]overnment expense.’98  
Therefore, to qualify for inadmissibility after applying for an adjustment of 
status, an applicant must have received SSI, cash assistance from TANF, state 
or local cash assistance programs for income maintenance, or Medicaid for long-
term care in a nursing home or mental health institution.99 This clarification was 
necessary as PRWORA had created confusion and fear in noncitizen 
communities, so much so that they began to avoid accessing medical care for the 
three years between 1996 and 1999 and may have jeopardized general public 
health as a result.100 The purpose of the INS guidance was to “reduce the 
negative public health consequences” already in effect by ensuring that 
immigrants still eligible for health benefits would not have access to health care 
counted against them in their immigration applications.101 The redefinition did 
not include non-cash benefits because they “generally provide supplementary 
support in the form of vouchers or direct services to support nutrition, health, 
 
 95 Id. at 7. 
 96 Id. The five states that fund SSI replacement programs are California, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, and New 
Hampshire. Id. at 11 n.34. 
 97 Id. at 7, 11 n.36 (“Sixteen states and the District of Columbia use federal funds (CHIP) to provide 
prenatal care to women regardless of immigration status, under the CHIP option that allows states to enroll 
fetuses in CHIP. The District of Columbia and New York provide prenatal care to women regardless of 
immigration status, using local or state funds.”). 
 98 Inadmissibility and Deportability on Public Charge Grounds, 64 Fed. Reg. 28,676, 28,677 (proposed 
May 26, 1999) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 212 and 237).  
 99 Id. at 28,677–78. 
 100 Id. at 28,676. Similarly, “the Urban Institute’s Well-Being and Basic Needs Survey (WBNS), fielded 
in December 2019 before the onset of the pandemic in the US, shows that many immigrant families went into 
the COVID-19 crisis afraid to access noncash public supports that might help them meet their family’s needs.” 
Immigrant Families Hit Hard by the Pandemic May Be Afraid to Receive the Help They Need, GCIR (June 5, 
2020), https://www.gcir.org/news/immigrant-families-hit-hard-pandemic-may-be-afraid-receive-help-they-
need.  
 101 Polly J. Price, Immigration Policy and Public Health, 16 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 235, 244 (2019). 
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and living condition needs” and do not reflect a complete dependence on the 
government.102 Such federally funded programs excluded from public charge 
consideration included Medicaid, use of health clinics, short-term rehabilitation 
services, prenatal care, emergency medical services, Children’s Health 
Insurance Program (CHIP), and Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program 
(SNAP).103 At the time, it was explicitly stated that these various non-cash 
benefits are, by nature, “supplemental and frequently support the general 
welfare.”104 The restriction of these benefits would be punitive,105 working to 
wring out all but the wealthiest and most able immigrants106 and flying in the 
face of “our commitment to assist members of our communities,” which has 
been in the American system from the colonial era107 and is engraved on the 
most paraded American landmark, the Statue of Liberty.108  
4. Federal Enactment of EMTALA  
Congress enacted EMTALA in 1986,109 before the passage of PWRORA. 
EMTALA is a crucial act that deeply alters the effect of public charge 
development on the healthcare industry.110 EMTALA’s impetus 
“undisputed[ly]” was a result of “highly publicized incidents” where patients 
were dumped from hospital emergency rooms based on the patient’s “financial 
inadequacy” to afford medical screenings and procedures that would otherwise 
be provided to a paying patient.111 Although EMTALA does not fit cleanly into 
 
 102 Inadmissibility and Deportability on Public Charge Grounds, 64 Fed. Reg. 28,676, 28,677–78 
(proposed May 26, 1999) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 212 and 237). 
 103 See id. at 28,678–79. Other federally funded programs excluded from public charge consideration 
include housing benefits, child care services, energy assistance, foster care and adoption assistance, Head Start, 
job training programs, community-based programs like soup kitchens and crisis counseling, non-cash benefits 
under TANF including subsidized child care or transit subsidies, earned cash payments such as social security, 
government pensions and veterans’ benefits, and unemployment compensation. See id.  
 104 Id. at 28,678. 
 105 See Makhlouf, supra note 5, at 189. 
 106 See Douglas C. Baynton, Defectives in the Land: Disability and American Immigration Policy, 24 J. 
AM. ETHNIC HIST. 31, 33 (2005). 
 107 HESTER ET AL., supra note 16, at 1–2. Contra Prerna Lal, A History of Exclusion: U.S. Deportation 
Policy Since 1882, at 1 (Nov. 28, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=2360963 (arguing “the gates to the American dream have not always been open to all”).  
 108 See Lazarus, supra note 1. 
 109 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2011). 
 110 See BOSTON PLANNING & DEV. AGENCY, IMPACT OF PROPOSED FEDERAL IMMIGRATION RULE 
CHANGES ON BOSTON: PUBLIC CHARGE TEST FOR INADMISSIBILITY 8, n.d., http://www.bostonplans.org/ 
getattachment/e856c564-bf0f-47d4-9a44-75b430903f82. See generally Update on Access to Health Care for 
Immigrants and Their Families, NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR., https://www.nilc.org/issues/health-care/update-on-
access-to-health-care-for-immigrants-and-their-families/ (last updated May 27, 2020). 
 111 See Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Grp., Inc., 917 F.2d 266, 268 (6th Cir. 1990). 
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a retrospective summary of public charge policy, its passage implicates 
healthcare centers in public charge discussions more than ever. The availability 
of emergency medical care to the poor and uninsured was a core concern of 
Congress when it enacted EMTALA,112 although its protections are not limited 
to those with “insufficient resources.”113 EMTALA “imposes two primary 
obligations” on hospitals that receive federal Medicare funding: (1) to 
appropriately examine individuals that enter emergency rooms for medical 
treatment to determine if there is an emergency medical condition; and (2) to 
“stabilize” the patient’s condition prior to transfer or discharge in the event of a 
medical emergency.114 Congress aimed to “get patients into the system” who 
may not be treated otherwise115 and, in effect, created an unfunded mandate that 
shifted costs of emergency healthcare access to hospitals and states that fund 
public hospitals.116 Fifty-five percent of emergency care is left uncompensated, 
placing a “severe” financial burden on hospitals complying with EMTALA.117 
It is evident that “at minimum,” Congress intended for all patients to be 
welcomed into emergency departments and cared for fairly, without being 
“simply . . . turned away.”118 The juxtaposition between the treatment of 
patients when they arrive at an emergency department in the United States and 
the new treatment of noncitizens when they attempt to access public health 
programs is stark and discouraging. At minimum, this Comment calls on 
Congress to ensure the cost burden on hospitals and local governments is not 
exacerbated by a manipulation of public charge policy to exclude noncitizens 
from accessing public health programs.  
II. THE 2019 PUBLIC CHARGE POLICY 
The 2019 public charge policy dramatically expands grounds for 
inadmissibility to immigrants and now includes accessing federally funded 
healthcare for which noncitizen populations are otherwise eligible, specifically 
Medicaid.119 Although the 2019 policy was temporarily halted in multiple 
federal district courts, the injunctions of the rule were not permanent, and the 
immigrant “wealth test” reared its head again after the executive branch had filed 
 
 112 See Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
 113 See Arrington v. Wong, 237 F.3d 1066, 1070 (9th Cir. 2001).  
 114 Hardy v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 164 F.3d 789, 792 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 115 Id. at 793. 
 116 Edward Monico, Is EMTALA That Bad?, 12 AMA J. ETHICS 471, 471–73 (2010). 
 117 See id. at 473. 
 118 See Reynolds v. Mainegeneral Health, 218 F.3d 78, 83 (1st Cir. 2000).  
 119 Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 41,292, 41,295–96 (Aug. 14, 2019) (to be 
codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 103, 212–14, 245, 248).  
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an emergency petition with the Supreme Court.120 In a 5 to 4 decision, the 
Supreme Court stayed the nationwide injunction granted in a New York district 
court in October 2019.121 DHS implemented the rule for five months, beginning 
on February 24, 2020, before it was again halted by a district court judge stating, 
“the government’s interest fails to measure up to the gravity of this global 
pandemic that continues to threaten the lives and economic well-being of 
America’s residents.”122 The 2019 rule is an apt example of how easily the public 
charge policy can be mangled and misused, turning the colonial establishment 
of “poor laws” into the implementation of a stricter “wealth test” on noncitizens 
than has ever existed before, and the danger that can and will arise if it goes 
unaddressed by Congress.123 Part II of this Comment highlights the central leaps 
the 2019 rule makes, the growing public health concerns rooted in the changing 
policy, and the major consequences immigrant families have experienced as a 
result of its proposal and implementation. 
A. Expansion of Inadmissibility Under Public Charge in 2019 
The 2019 policy unravels the meaning of “public charge” from a person 
becoming primarily dependent on the government, as it has long been 
understood and accepted, to a quantifiable and burdensome definition of “an 
alien who receives one or more public benefits.”124 The public benefits 
considered for public charge had previously always been cash benefits or long-
term institutionalization; now, DHS, previously INS, aims to include non-cash 
benefit programs that are vital to supporting low-income households.125 
Of the various federally funded benefits that were previously deemed 
essential to the public welfare and did not include restrictions based on 
immigration status, four subsections are now included as grounds for 
inadmissibility, as well as denial of an adjustment of status for lawful permanent 
residents.126 The rule change will include use of non-emergency Medicaid, 
 
 120 Barnes & Sacchetti, supra note 12. 
 121 Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. New York, 140 S.Ct. 599 (2020). See Statement from the Press Secretary, 
WHITE HOUSE (Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-press-secretary-87/.  
 122 Chris Dolmetsch, Trump’s Green Card Wealth Test Rule Blocked During Pandemic, BLOOMBERG LAW 
(July 30, 2020, 12:57 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/trumps-green-card-wealth-test-rule-
blocked-during-pandemic?context=search&index=4. 
 123 Hirsi, supra note 16; see also Barnes & Sacchetti, supra note 12 (publicizing the phrase “wealth test” 
to describe the public charge rule). 
 124 Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 83 Fed. Reg. 51,114, 51,157–58 (proposed Oct. 10, 2018) 
(to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 103, 212, 213, 214, 245, and 248).  
 125 Makhlouf, supra note 5, at 197–98. 
 126 See Trump’s Statement on the 2019 Rule Change, supra note 41. 
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SNAP, Medicare Part D (low-income subsidy), and housing assistance such as 
public housing, housing vouchers, and rental assistance.127 The rule also expands 
the totality of circumstances test to include specific “negatively weighed” factors 
when assessing a noncitizen’s age, health, skills, work experience, and 
dependents, such as earning under 125% of the federal poverty line, certain 
health conditions if the applicant does not have access to private health 
insurance, credit history, education, and proficiency of the English language.128 
To balance the negatively weighed factors, the 2019 rule proposed a single 
“heavily weighed positive” factor of having an income over 250% of the federal 
poverty line.129 Consequently, even if a person does not use any of the 
enumerated federal and state benefits, they could still be deemed ‘likely to 
become a public charge.’130  
In addition to the inclusion of these public benefit programs, DHS has also 
expanded inadmissibility by including guidelines for the totality of the 
circumstances test. DHS has specified that enrollment in any public benefit 
program within the past thirty-six months from the date of application or a 
noncitizen’s lack of private health insurance will be regarded as a “heavily 
weighed negative factor” in considering the totality of the circumstances.131 
Without the “financial resources to pay for reasonably foreseeable medical 
costs,” the federal government argues the individual is at a higher risk of 
becoming a public charge; in the policy, this factor is only required for 
individuals who have reported a medical condition that would require extensive 
medical treatment.132  
However, the executive branch released a proclamation to take effect less 
than three weeks from the enactment of the new public charge rule that 
significantly broadens the restriction on noncitizens seeking to enter the United 
States.133 According to the proclamation, any individual seeking to enter the 
 
 127 See Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 83 Fed. Reg. 51,114, 51,159–60 (proposed Oct. 10, 
2018) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 103, 212, 213, 214, 245, and 248). 
 128 Id. at 51,291–92. 
 129 Id. at 51,292. The final 2019 rule lists three “heavily weighted positive factors,” adding consideration 
of whether an immigrant has private health insurance or is employed in the legal field and accruing an income 
exceeding 250% of the federal poverty level. Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 41,292, 
41,504 (Aug. 14, 2019) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 103, 212, 213, 214, 245, and 248).  
 130 See Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,502. 
 131 See Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 83 Fed. Reg. at 51,199–200; Inadmissibility on Public 
Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,504 (Aug. 14, 2019). 
 132 See Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 83 Fed. Reg. at 51,200.  
 133 Donald J. Trump, Presidential Proclamation on the Suspension of Entry of Immigrants Who Will 
Financially Burden the United States Healthcare System, WHITE HOUSE (Oct. 4, 2019), https://www. 
whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-proclamation-suspension-entry-immigrants-will-financially-
DAUDIPROOFS_9.30.20 9/30/2020 12:13 PM 
222 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:201 
country has to provide proof of health insurance to take effect within thirty days 
of their entry into the United States.134 If this proclamation stands alongside the 
new public charge policy, all noncitizens seeking to enter the United States after 
November 2019 will face a much higher hurdle than noncitizens already present 
within the United States and seeking to adjust their status.135 DHS’s change of 
public charge policy and the recent executive proclamation requiring health 
insurance reflect the federal administration’s interest in overhauling 
immigration policy on the whole and moving to a “merit-based” system that 
favors wealthy immigrants and excludes noncitizens, even if they are not 
completely dependent on the government for support.136  
B. Growing Public Health Concerns from Growing Public Charge Policy 
Since before the welfare reform legislation of 1996, public health concerns 
have guided the development of immigration and public charge policy. The 
World Health Organization describes social detriments of health (SDH) as 
economic and political “systems shaping the conditions of daily life” that impact 
birth, growth, work, life, and aging.137 SDH impact “individual and population 
health”138 in complex ways, and legal scholars have long established the public 
health concerns arising from shifting immigration policy over the decades.139 
Around the time Congress passed welfare reform in 1996, it also considered 
eliminating access to public healthcare services140 and was met with significant 
objections on the basis that (1) noncitizens accounted for a small fraction of the 
beneficiaries of the services, and (2) restricting access to preventive healthcare 
would increase the cost of emergency medical care that would remain 
unrestricted.141 Under the new rule, DHS acknowledges and lists the harms that 
 
burden-united-states-healthcare-system/. 
 134 Id. The proclamation would not affect noncitizens already in the United States, and, in lieu of acquiring 
health insurance, a noncitizen can demonstrate that they have the financial means to cover medical costs. Id. 
 135 Id. 
 136 See Makhlouf, supra note 5, at 197. So far, Congress has not implemented any drastic immigration 
change that reflects the temperament of the executive. Id.  
 137 Social Determinants of Health, WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int/social_determinants/en/ 
(last visited Sept. 3, 2020). 
 138 Makhlouf, supra note 5, at 189–90. 
 139 See generally Price, supra note 101, at 245 (stating that public charge doctrine “could lead 
to . . . increased prevalence of communicable diseases, including among members of the U.S. citizen 
population”) (citations omitted). 
 140 See, e.g., S. 1664, 104th Cong. (1996) (“A BILL To . . . reduce the use of welfare by aliens[.]”); H.R. 
999, 104th Cong. (1995) (“A BILL To . . . restrict alien eligibility for certain education, training, and other 
programs[.]”); H.R. 341, 104th Cong. (1995) (“A BILL To prohibit direct Federal financial benefits and 
unemployment benefits for illegal aliens.”). 
 141 See generally Karen M. Longacher, Losing the Forest for the Trees: How Current Immigration 
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will inevitably be caused to individuals, families, and communities that are no 
longer free to access previously excluded public benefits, such as Medicaid. The 
2019 policy indicates that  
[d]isenrollment or foregoing enrollment in public benefits programs 
by aliens . . . could lead to:  
 Worse health outcomes, including increased prevalence of 
obesity and malnutrition, especially for pregnant or 
breastfeeding women, infants, or children, and reduced 
prescription adherence;  
 Increased use of emergency rooms and emergent care as a 
method of primary health care due to delayed treatment;  
 Increased prevalence of communicable diseases, including 
among members of the U.S. citizen population who are not 
vaccinated; 
 Increases in uncompensated care in which a treatment or 
service is not paid for by an insurer or patient; and 
 Increased rates of poverty and housing instability; and 
 Reduced productivity and educational attainment.142  
Within this language, DHS admits to two distinct concerns present in the 
objection to changing public charge policy since the late 1990s: (1) the resulting 
increased use and cost of emergency medical care and (2) an increase in 
communicable diseases within the entire population.143  
The 2019 public charge policy breaks from the historical development of 
public charge that was molded by concerns for public health, and although it 
explicitly names the harm that implementation will cause, it shirks all 
responsibility. Without access to programs such as Medicaid, noncitizen 
populations are predicted to react similarly to the welfare reform in 1996, when 
the common misunderstanding was that public health services were being 
restricted in the way DHS purports to be acting—the confusion and fear led to 
“significant, negative public health consequences across the country.”144 The 
restriction of access to public benefits that were previously accepted and defined 
as “non-cash benefits [that] do not demonstrate primary dependence [on the 
government for assistance]”145 is punitive, essentially punishing low-income 
 
Proposals Overlook Crucial Issues, 11 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 429, 443–44 (1997). 
 142 Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 83 Fed. Reg. 51,114, 51,270 (proposed Oct. 10, 2018) (to 
be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 103, 212, 213, 214, 245, and 248).  
 143 Id. 
 144 Inadmissibility and Deportability on Public Charge Grounds, 64 Fed. Reg. 28,676 (May 26, 1999) 
(codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 212 and 237); see Price, supra note 101, at 244. 
 145 Inadmissibility and Deportability on Public Charge Grounds, 64 Fed. Reg. at 28,678. 
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immigrants for their low-income status when they cannot afford private health 
insurance.  
For noncitizens already within the United States, the anticipated negative 
health consequences are clear and immediate, on themselves and on the general 
public.146 In the 2019 rule, inadmissibility considerations for an adjustment of 
status from a temporary visitor to a legal permanent resident would consider the 
past thirty-six months that a noncitizen resided within the country, which public 
benefits the person accessed, and how often they accessed those benefits.147 
Noncitizens who were previously eligible to adjust their status would fail the 
inadmissibility “totality of circumstances” test,148 and out of fear would wait 
another thirty-six months, now restricted from access to public benefits they 
previously leaned on.149 The 2019 rule impacts the health and safety of the 
general American public who will be affected by the extreme choices 
noncitizens are having to make over the course of three or more years to qualify 
for permanent resident status within the United States.150 Economic and political 
policies, such as restricting public benefits through public charge considerations, 
not only change the course of a noncitizen’s life, but also significantly impact 
the community overall.151  
Although DHS issued the final rule in mid-August 2019, various studies by 
scholars and advocates were used as expert declarations in the lawsuits to halt 
the rule from taking effect. An estimate proposed that as many as 3.2 million 
fewer immigrants may not receive Medicaid because of the “chilling effect” of 
the 2019 rule; the resulting “loss of Medicaid coverage” could lead to as many 
as 4,000 excess deaths every year.152 An economist estimated that 1.8 million 
 
 146 Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 83 Fed. Reg. at 51,270.  
 147 Id. at 51,199–51,200; see Trump’s Statement on the 2019 Rule Change, supra note 41. 
 148 Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 83 Fed. Reg. at 51,198–51,203.  
 149 Id. at 51,270. 
 150 See Makhlouf, supra note 5, at 208–09. 
 151 See id. 
 152 Leighton Ku, New Evidence Demonstrates That the Public Charge Rule Will Harm Immigrant Families 
and Others, HEALTH AFFS. (Oct. 9, 2019), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20191008.70483/ 
full/ (noting that the majority of the immigrants that will be affected are Latinx or Asian, and many have serious 
health problems such as diabetes, heart disease, or cancer). In the midst of global endeavors to combat COVID-
19, state and local governments argue that the public charge limitations “imped[e] efforts to stop the spread of 
the coronavirus, preserve scarce hospital capacity and medical supplies, and protect the lives of everyone in our 
communities—citizens and noncitizens alike.” Motion by Government Plaintiffs at 14, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. 
v. New York, No. 19A785 (U.S. Apr. 13, 2020). The grave implications of disincentivizing immigrants from 
accessing healthcare services, including testing and treatment, during a public health crisis are clear: immigrants 
will be more likely to contract a “serious illness if infected and spread the virus inadvertently to others—risks 
that are heightened because immigrants make up a large proportion of the essential workers who continue to 
interact with the public.” Id. at 2. 
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fewer people would use SNAP benefits, even though many of them may be 
citizens.153 Housing experts noted that a loss of housing security from the 
withholding of federal housing benefits would likely lead to worse health 
outcomes, emphasizing that even indirect changes in the 2019 rule are a clear 
detriment to public health.154 Over sixty public health and policy scholars, 
chairs, and faculty, alongside the American Public Health Association and the 
American Academy of Nursing, joined an amicus brief in La Clinica de la Raza 
v. Trump describing how the 2019 public charge rule “threatens public health on 
a national scale.”155 DHS acknowledges the noted concerns, the threat to public 
health, and the effect on SDH in its final proposal, further highlighting the risk 
the Trump Administration consciously undertook by steering public charge 
policy down a dangerous path.156  
C. Damaging Effects of the 2019 Proposal and Upcoming Implementation 
Even though the proposed rule was just that—a proposal—for five months 
after the delay in implementation, immigrant communities that fear retaliation 
became wary of crackdowns on eligibility.157 In the confusion caused by the 
proposed rule change, similarly to the confusion created after the passage of 
PRWORA,158 many noncitizens stopped utilizing public benefits they are legally 
allowed to access before the rule even went into effect.159 CASA, an 
 
 153 Ku, supra note 152 (discussing how reduction in SNAP benefits would reduce food assistance 
payments by $2 billion per year, and noting how this would also lower economic activity in the United States 
by $3.2 billion annually). Ninez Ponce and Laurel Lucia estimated that the loss of federal Medicaid and SNAP 
benefits could “reduce economic output in California by as much as $2.8 billion, leading to a loss of 17,700 
jobs.” Id. Using a similar approach, an amicus brief submitted by the Fiscal Policy Institute and the Presidents’ 
Alliance on Higher Education and Immigration included estimates indicating that “the public charge rule could 
lead to $14 to $24 billion in economic output lost across the United States, also leading to substantial job losses.” 
Id. 
 154 Id. The loss of housing benefits would also lead to “lower education attainment, and would lower 
lifetime earnings for certain individuals.” Id. The housing expert also noted that “harmful effects of the public 
charge rule could be exacerbated by a rule proposed by the Department of Housing and Urban Development that 
would keep ‘mixed status’ families from living together in public housing by barring non-citizen members.” Id. 
The attack on immigrant families and public health is brought from all directions, and it is a concerted, strategic 
effort to scare the most marginalized members of society from seeking stability within the United States. Id. 
 155 See Brief of Amici Curiae Public Health at 1, La Clinica de la Raza v. Trump, No. 4:19-cv-04980-PJH 
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2019) (capitalization altered). 
 156 See Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 41,292, 41,408–09 (Aug. 14, 2019) (to be 
codified at C.F.R. pts. 103, 212, 213, 214, 245, and 248).  
 157 Inadmissibility and Deportability on Public Charge Grounds, 64 Fed. Reg. 28,676 (May 26, 1999) 
(codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 121 and 237). 
 158 See id. 
 159 New Lawsuit Argues Trump Administration’s “Public Charge” Rule Is Unconstitutionally Vague, 
CASA (Sept. 16, 2019), https://wearecasa.org/updates/new-lawsuit-argues-trump-administrations-public-charge-
rule-is-unconstitutionally-vague/. 
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organization with over 100,000 members in the mid-Atlantic region, is 
challenging the 2019 rule in Maryland on behalf of low-wage immigrants that it 
claims are unconstitutionally discriminated against.160 CASA claimed to be 
“already experiencing the negative effects” of the new rule in September 2019, 
one month before any change was to take effect.161 Their members “stopped 
accepting or refused to apply for public benefits for themselves and their family 
members, including their children, because of fear that receiving any benefits 
will harm their ability to stay in the United States.”162 This experience was 
shared among immigrant communities across the nation.  
For noncitizens within the country, any threat to their status or their ability 
to adjust their legal permanent resident status to obtain a green card manifests in 
a risk to be torn away from their families and children within the United States. 
Nearly 550,000 people apply for green cards every year, and of those, 380,000 
are noncitizens already legally present within the United States who are 
attempting to change their status and are afraid of the risks posed by the 
proposal, and now the implementation, of the 2019 policy.163 According to a 
comprehensive survey conducted by the Urban Institute, one in seven adults in 
immigrant families (13.7%) reported that they, or a family member, did not 
participate in non-cash government benefit programs for which they were 
eligible in 2018 for fear of risking a future green card.164 In low-income families, 
20.7% of adult immigrants reported their limitation of public benefits.165  
DHS leaked the proposed rule change in 2018 and only finalized it in August 
of 2019; yet, these communities suffered from the confusion and “chilling 
effects” caused by the federal government in seeking this rule change.166 Even 
when the nationwide injunction was in effect, immigrant families were not able 
to breathe easily; now as lower courts consider the issue and the policy is on 
temporary hold pending the resolution of the COVID-19 pandemic, fear 
 
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. 
 163 See Sarah Holder, How Rule Changes About Public Benefits Could Affect Immigrants, CITYLAB 
(Aug. 13, 2019, 5:09 PM), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2019/08/public-charge-rule-legal-immigration-
welfare-services-dhs/595987/. 
 164 Hamutal Bernstein, Dulce Gonzalez, Michael Karpman & Stephen Zuckerman, One in Seven Adults in 
Immigrant Families Reported Avoiding Public Benefit Programs in 2018, URB. INST. (May 22, 2019), https:// 
www.urban.org/research/publication/one-seven-adults-immigrant-families-reported-avoiding-public-benefit-
programs-2018. This evidence is the first instance of the systemic chilling effects resulting from the proposed 
rule among immigrant families. Id. 
 165 Id. 
 166 The Public Charge Rule, Explained, supra note 32. 
DAUDIPROOFS_9.30.20 9/30/2020 12:13 PM 
2020] THE COST OF PUBLIC CHARGE 227 
continues to grip immigrant communities.167 Of all the restrictive regulations 
proposed by the Trump Administration, this rule would have the “deepest, 
widest and most long term impact.”168 The 2019 rule will “linger as a sword 
hanging over the heads of immigrant families and the communities in which they 
live, continuing to engender fear” as they struggle to achieve success and 
stability for their families as new members of American society.169 
III. THE POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL STRINGS ATTACHED TO PUBLIC 
CHARGE POLICY 
The development of public charge policy has been weaponized by the federal 
government as a political tactic to force noncitizens to live in fear of fickle policy 
swaying to include public health programs at the whim of the executive branch. 
The cost of penalizing noncitizens from accessing public health programs they 
are entitled to is a cumulative result of cascading dominos—beginning with the 
rise in emergency care costs under EMTALA and indirectly leading to increased 
burdens on the healthcare industry, state and local governments, and effectively 
the taxpayer. This Part addresses the political strings attached to public charge 
policy and the subtle, yet powerful, threats, and costs posed by the 
implementation of the 2019 rule on states and the healthcare industry.  
A. Political Weaponization of Public Charge 
The 2019 rule unfairly targets noncitizens in the United States as sources of 
public charge. If the citizenship eligibility requirements from the 2019 rule were 
placed on people born within the United States, “nearly half of them would be 
deemed inadmissible on the grounds of becoming a public charge.”170 Between 
41% and 48% of native-born U.S. citizens use SNAP, TANF, SSI, housing 
assistance, or Medicaid, and these statistics have been consistent from 1997, 
after the passage of PRORWA, to 2017, before the leak of the proposed rule.171 
For Medicaid, noncitizens only comprise 6.5% of enrolled patients, whereas 
 
 167 See Wendy E. Parmet, Five Victories for Public Health: Courts Enjoin the Public Charge Rule, 
HEALTH AFFS. (Oct. 18, 2019), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20191018.747447/full/.  
 168 Geneva Sands, 13 States Sue over Legal Immigration ‘Public Charge’ Rule, CNN (Aug. 15, 2019, 1:11 
PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/08/15/politics/13-states-sue-public-charge-immigration/index.html (citations 
omitted). 
 169 Ku, supra note 152. 
 170 Id. (citing Decl. of Danilo Trisi at 3, La Clinica de la Raza v. Trump, No. 4:19-cv-04980-PJH (N.D. 
Cal. Oct. 11, 2019)). 
 171 Id. (citing Decl. of Danilo Trisi at 3, La Clinica de la Raza v. Trump, No. 4:19-cv-04980-PJH (N.D. 
Cal. Oct. 11, 2019)). 
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over 87% are patients born within the United States.172 The focus on noncitizens 
as public charge is simply one of the myriad ways the Trump Administration has 
targeted immigrants and their families, weaponizing the federal government 
against the people looking to the Statue of Liberty as a beacon of welcome and 
hope. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services Acting Director Ken 
Cuccinelli, a defendant in the litigation brought against the federal government 
for this 2019 rule, tweaked the famous poem at the base of the Statue of Liberty 
and commented, “Give me your tired and your poor who can stand on their own 
two feet and who will not become a public charge.”173 Of the approximately 
544,000 noncitizens applying for a green card every year, 382,000 are in 
categories that would be affected by the application of the 2019 rule.174 The 
contrasting standards for access to public benefits for citizens and noncitizens 
exist in many countries,175 and although most noncitizens remain ineligible for 
public benefits of any kind in the United States, the inclusion of non-cash 
benefits such as Medicaid for short-term care is an excessive restriction the 
executive branch implemented in 2020 for immigrants who are otherwise 
eligible.  
Scholars have noted that this is not the first time the conflation of 
immigration and healthcare policies have been used to create unfounded fear of 
immigrants as a danger.176 In an attempt to whip support for a southern border 
 
 172 Hajela, supra note 8 (“For food assistance, immigrants are 8.8 percent of recipients, with over 85 
percent of participants being native-born.”). 
 173 Alvarez et al., supra note 9. 
 174 Hajela, supra note 8.  
 175 See generally Wendy E. Parmet, Symposium: The Worst of Health: Law and Policy at the Intersection 
of Health & Immigration, 16 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 211, 231–32 (2019) (explaining why immigrants are “easy 
scapegoats” and “exclusionist immigration policy” is utilized to draw lines between citizens and noncitizens in 
the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom).  
 176 Id. at 213. On April 20, 2020, President Trump tweeted that the administration would be halting “most 
legal immigration to the United States in the wake of the COVID-19 epidemic,” following the limitation of 
coronavirus relief checks from many immigrants. Brian Bennett, President Trump Has Blocked New Legal 
Immigrants. Here’s Where Else He’s Clamped Down on Immigration During the Coronavirus Outbreak, TIME 
(Apr. 21, 2020, 10:13 PM), https://time.com/5825141/president-trump-immigration-coronavirus/. Seasonal 
workers are exempt from the halt to immigration, but over 10,000 migrants who crossed the border were removed 
from the country without being screened for asylum requests. Id. The Army Corps of Engineers are not being 
mobilized to combat coronavirus; instead, they are continuing to work with Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) 
to build a 450-mile border wall by the end of 2020. Id. Acting CBP Commissioner Mark Morgan claims that in 
light of COVID-19, “[n]ow more than ever, borders matter, border security matters, the wall matters,” 
manipulating fear of the pandemic to push the Trump Administration’s immigration agenda. Id.; see also Terence 
M. Garrett, COVID-19, Wall Building, and the Effects on Migrant Protection Protocols by the Trump 
Administration: The Spectacle of the Worsening Human Rights Disaster on the Mexico-U.S. Border, ADMIN. 
THEORY & PRAXIS (Apr. 9, 2020), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10841806.2020.1750212 
(“While the Trump administration is not the first to implement anti-migrant policies, it is highly aggressive 
toward migrants and asylum seekers.”).  
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wall, President Trump claimed, “people with tremendous medical difficulty and 
medical problems are pouring in, and in many cases it’s contagious.”177 This 
Administration is simultaneously (and inaccurately) claiming that people in need 
of medical support to contain contagious diseases are entering the country while 
also limiting immigrants’ access to healthcare, thereby furthering any perceived 
threat to public health.178  
The guise of furthering communicable disease control has been used to 
expand immigration control since the first immigration laws, and the 
Immigration and Naturalization Act allows the executive branch sole discretion 
to determine the list of communicable diseases that could be used to exclude 
immigrants.179 HIV-positive noncitizens were barred from visiting or 
immigrating to the United States long after the disease was already endemic in 
the country.180 When Congress acted in the 1990s, its focus was to exclude HIV-
positive Haitian refugees from the United States; at this point, excluding 
immigrants with HIV would do nothing to prevent the spread of AIDS in the 
country, and health officials had already issued warnings that any discrimination 
and stigmatization of the disease would obstruct prevention efforts.181 HIV was 
further misunderstood and the public health suffered greatly from the association 
of the disease and its medical consequences as exclusive to specific groups of 
people by singling out Haitian refugees.182 Similarly, public health is not 
protected by excluding noncitizens on the basis of their potential use of 
Medicaid; however, it is further put in danger when people within the United 
States are restricted from accessing public benefits they are legally allowed to 
utilize. 
Anti-immigrant sentiment has influenced policy regarding access to health 
programs for some time and on various levels. A campaign in California in 1994 
described immigrants as a drain on the state’s healthcare system, and the state 
passed Proposition 187 to bar undocumented immigrants from accessing public 
health benefits by requiring healthcare workers to report anyone they suspected 
 
 177 Philip Bump, Trump’s Arguments for Necessity of Border Wall Have Already Been Broadly Debunked, 
WASH. POST (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/12/11/trumps-arguments-necessity-
border-wall-have-already-been-broadly-debunked/?utm_term=.6b440e812164/. 
 178 Id.; see also Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 83 Fed. Reg. 51,270 (Oct. 10, 2018) (to be 
codified at 8 C.F.R. at pts. 103, 212, 213, 214, 245 and 248) (noting “[i]ncreased prevalence of communicable 
diseases, including among members of the U.S. citizen population who are not vaccinated”).  
 179 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(i) (2016). 
 180 Parmet, supra note 175, at 216. 
 181 Id.  
 182 See PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS EPIDEMIC, REPORT OF THE 
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS EPIDEMIC 128 (1988). 
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of being undocumented.183 This sentiment traveled up to the federal government 
and garnered support for the passage of PRWORA in 1996.184 When confronted 
by the financial crisis of 2008, many states first cut their inclusion of immigrants 
in public health benefits that were designed to supplement the hole created by 
PRWORA.185 In the debates leading up to the passage of the Affordable Care 
Act in 2009, the rumor that the health benefits would cover undocumented 
immigrants as well as documented immigrants and citizens was a main point of 
contention.186 The opposition to the inclusion of immigrants in a federally 
funded healthcare program prioritized the denial of healthcare to immigrants 
over ensuring that citizens were given access to healthcare through the 
Affordable Care Act.187  
The United States is not alone in its nationalist agenda: in Europe, 
immigrants are also blamed for diseases, and Brexit supporters believe that 
immigrants caused a decline in the quality of publicly funded health programs.188 
The former Polish Prime Minister spouted accusations of migrants similar to that 
of the United States’ leadership, claiming migrants brought diseases to Europe 
that were “very dangerous” and “long absent” from the continent.189 As 
migration has increased, European nations have also cut back on programs that 
cover immigrants.190 The United States and some European nations have not 
established universal health care programs,191 and, as a result, it is difficult to 
argue for the allocation of public money to provide public health benefits to 
noncitizens before the benefits are guaranteed for their own citizens.192 The 
 
 183 Parmet, supra note 175, at 216 (citing CA’s Anti-Immigrant Proposition 187 Is Voided, Ending State’s 
Five-Year Battle with ACLU, Rights Groups, ACLU (July 29, 1999), https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/cas-
anti-immigrant-proposition-187-voided-ending-states-five-year-battle-aclu-rights). However, Proposition 187 
was quickly enjoined by the courts and never went into effect. Id. 
 184 Id. at 216–17. 
 185 See, e.g., Hong Pham v. Starkowski, 16 A.3d 635, 637 (Conn. 2011). Massachusetts was one state that 
adopted a version of universal healthcare in 2006, which excluded legally present immigrants from what was 
the state’s predecessor to the Affordable Care Act. Parmet, supra note 175, at 217. 
 186 Parmet, supra note 175, at 217. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Id.; see Public Wrong on Key Facts Around Brexit and Impact of EU Membership, KING’S COLL. 
LONDON (Oct. 28, 2018), https://www.kcl.ac.uk/news/public-wrong-on-key-facts-around-brexit-and-impact-of-
eu-membership. 
 189 Jan Cienski, Migrants Carry ‘Parasites and Protozoa,’ Warns Polish Opposition Leader, POLITICO 
(Oct. 14, 2015, 6:21 PM), https://www.politico.eu/article/migrants-asylum-poland-kaczynski-election/. 
 190 Parmet, supra note 175, at 218; see, e.g., Abby Young-Powell, Austria Plans to Cut Benefits for Non-
German Speaking Immigrants, TELEGRAPH (May 29, 2018, 5:48 PM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/ 
05/29/austria-plans-cut-benefits-non-german-speaking-immigrants/. 
 191 Parmet, supra note 175, at 218. 
 192 Price, supra note 36, at 918 (noting that sovereign countries prefer an “ideal class” of physically and 
mentally fit immigrants and exclude disabled persons, justified by the “nation’s prerogative to choose its 
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global reach of anti-immigration sentiment does not, however, justify restricting 
immigrants who qualify for federal programs from accessing healthcare; it 
merely reflects the consequences of federal agencies conflating immigration 
policy with healthcare policy without proper oversight or congressional input. 
Allowing immigration officials to use their discretion regarding the perceived 
health status of a noncitizen in determining their qualifications for citizenship is 
incredibly dangerous, and although this issue expands beyond public charge 
policy, the 2019 rule will be misused as an instrument for racial and ethnic bias 
in immigration proceedings.  
Under the most recent weaponization of public charge against “undesirable” 
immigrants, the disparate impact would be felt most strongly by people of color, 
pressuring as many as 18.3 million Latinx noncitizens and their family members 
from disenrolling or foregoing use of public benefit programs, including 
Medicaid; this number encompasses roughly 70% of the total noncitizen 
families at risk.193 Additionally, DHS arbitrarily placed the income threshold for 
inclusion in public charge at 250% of the federal poverty line, “blocking 71% 
[of] applicants from Mexico and Central America, 69% from Africa, and 52% 
from Asia—but only 36% from Europe, Canada, and Oceania.”194 The 2019 rule 
also listed English proficiency as a factor, emphasizing its disparate impact.195 
Six of the top seven countries with the highest rates of English proficiency are 
in Europe, whereas none are in Latin America or Africa; twenty-three of the 
twenty-four countries with the lowest rates of English proficiency, however, are 
in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East.196  
Public charge is being changed and directed at immigrants that do not meet 
the Trump Administration’s expectation of wealth and stability and who are 
 
membership”). 
 193 Elizabeth G. Taylor, National Health Law Program Comments Filed on Proposed Public Charge Rule 
Change, NAT’L HEALTH L. PROGRAM, https://healthlaw.org/resource/national-health-law-program-comments-
filed-on-proposed-public-charge-rule/ (last visited June 29, 2020); see also Public Charge Proposed Rule: 
Potentially Chilled Population Data, MANATT (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.manatt.com/insights/articles/2018/ 
public-charge-rule-potentially-chilled-population. 
 194 Looming Immigration Directive Could Separate Nearly 200,000 Married Couples Each Year, 
BOUNDLESS (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.boundless.com/blog/looming-immigration-directive-separate-nearly-
200000-married-couples/. There are additional ways in which the public charge rule will discriminate between 
noncitizens. Washington v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 408 F. Supp. 3d 1191, 1202 (E.D. Wash. 2019); see 
Jynnah Radford, Key Findings About U.S. Immigrants, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 17, 2019), https://www. 
pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/17/key-findings-about-u-s-immigrants/ (“54% [of immigrants from Mexico] 
and 46% [of immigrants from Central America] . . . do not have a high school diploma, vs. 9% of U.S. born.”). 
 195 Public Charge, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., https://www.ilrc.org/public-charge (last visited June 7, 
2020) (“The rules allow immigration officers to consider English proficiency (positive) or lack of English 
proficiency (negative)[.]”).  
 196 EDUC. FIRST, EF ENGLISH PROFICIENCY INDEX 6–7 (2018). 
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unable to pay the “cover charge” to enter the country.197 The 2019 iteration of 
public charge is being called a “racist wealth test” because it targets immigrants 
from majority non-white countries and immigrants who do not have the wealth 
to acquire private health insurance.198 The same immigrants who will struggle 
to meet the parameters of the new public charge rule are also targets of SDH, 
including racism, and already face barriers to health equity.199 Healthcare 
facilities serving marginalized communities, such as people of color and people 
living in poverty, are often under-resourced and under-staffed.200 Immigrants in 
these communities already face inequities in access to and quality of healthcare 
and are victims of racial and ethnic health disparities.201 Frustrating the already 
disproportionate access to healthcare in these communities will further threaten 
public health and overwhelm the resources of hospitals struggling to manage 
uninsured patients, the majority of whom are from non-white populations.202  
The public charge policy claims to ensure that the United States will not be 
overburdened by the inclusion of noncitizens that are reliant on the federal 
government for support; instead of achieving its goal, the 2019 policy is 
misconstrued and weaponized as a political tool to strike fear into the hearts of 
immigrant communities and discriminate against noncitizens that are not from 
Norway.203  
 
 197 Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (@AOC), TWITTER (Jan. 27, 2020, 2:52 PM), https://twitter.com/AOC/ 
status/1221883795672129540; see also Andrew Chung, U.S. Supreme Court Lets Hardline Trump Immigration 
Policy Take Effect, REUTERS (Jan. 27, 2020, 1:34 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-
immigration/u-s-supreme-court-allows-trumps-public-charge-immigration-curb-idUSKBN1ZQ24N (“Limiting 
legal immigration based on an applicant’s wealth is shameful and entirely un-American[.]”) (citations omitted). 
 198 Andrea Germanos, ‘Shameful. Disgusting. Disgraceful.’: Outrage After Supreme Court Allows 
Trump’s Public Charge Rule to Take Effect, COMMON DREAMS (Jan. 27, 2020), https://www.commondreams. 
org/news/2020/01/27/shameful-disgusting-disgraceful-outrage-after-supreme-court-allows-trumps-public.  
 199 See Racism and Health, AM. PUB. HEALTH ASS’N, https://www.apha.org/topics-and-issues/health-
equity/racism-and-health (last visited Sept. 3, 2020). 
 200 Institutional Racism in the Health Care System, AM. ACAD. FAM. PHYSICIANS, https://www.aafp.org/ 
about/policies/all/institutional-racism.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2020). 
 201 Id. Although the impact of COVID-19 will continue to be tracked, current data indicates a 
disproportionate “burden of illness and death among racial and ethnic minority groups.” Coronavirus Disease 
2019 (COVID-19): COVID-19 in Racial and Ethnic Minority Groups, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/racial-ethnic-minorities. 
html (last visited Apr. 22, 2020) (“Existing health disparities, such as poorer underlying health and barriers to 
getting health care, might make members of many racial and ethnic minority groups especially vulnerable in 
public health emergencies like outbreaks of COVID-19.”); see also Ronald J. Daniels & Marc H. Morial, The 
Covid-19 Racial Disparities Could Be Even Worse Than We Think, WASH. POST (Apr. 23, 2020), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/04/23/covid-19-racial-disparities-could-be-even-worse-than-we-think/.  
 202 Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19): COVID-19 in Racial and Ethnic Minority Groups, supra note 
201. 
 203 Jen Kirby, Trump Wants Fewer Immigrants from “Shithole Countries” and More from Places like 
Norway, VOX (Jan. 11, 2018, 5:55 PM), https://www.vox.com/2018/1/11/16880750/trump-immigrants-shithole-
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B. Public Charge Is Changing, but at What Cost? 
The danger to public health is not the inclusion of immigrants in society; 
rather, it is the exclusion of these families from accessing Medicaid and other 
federal non-cash benefit programs. The adverse health effects caused by not 
having health insurance are easy to spot; however, the more complex societal 
issues will result in increased costs and greater inefficiency for healthcare 
systems.204 PRWORA restricts unqualified immigrants, including 
undocumented immigrants and visitors, from accessing Medicaid and CHIP and 
introduced a five-year bar on qualified immigrants before they could utilize 
those programs.205 However, this restriction does not include access to 
emergency medical treatment under Emergency Medicaid.206 Emergency 
Medicaid reimburses hospitals that provide emergency medical treatment, as 
required by EMTALA, to examine and stabilize patients presenting 
emergencies.207 By including EMTALA in the coverage anyone within the 
United States is eligible to receive, even after the passage of PRWORA, 
Congress acknowledged the importance of addressing emergencies and 
reimbursing hospitals for the costs accumulated for treating immigrants that 
PRWORA otherwise excluded from receiving or participating in federal health 
insurance programs.208 Essentially, by limiting an immigrant’s access to public 
benefits but guaranteeing that they will receive medical attention in an 
emergency situation, many immigrants that are generally unqualified or are 
within the five-year bar under PRWORA are forced to wait until an emergency 
medical situation before they can seek assistance “in the most expensive setting, 
the emergency room.”209  
 
countries-norway (“Trump reportedly referred to Haiti and countries in Africa as ‘shithole countries’ and called 
for more immigrants from places like Norway[.]”); see also Washington v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 408 
F. Supp. 3d 1191, 1204 (E.D. Wash. 2019) (recognizing that these “regulations…will make immigrant families 
fearful of seeking health care services like primary care and routine health screenings [and] will increase the 
burden of both disease and healthcare costs across the country”). 
 204 See Parmet, supra note 175, at 223. 
 205 See PRWORA § 403(a), 110 Stat. 2105, 2265 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1613). 
 206 Id. at 2266.  
 207 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395cc, 1395dd (2012). 
 208 See Parmet, supra note 175, at 219. 
 209 Id. In a nation struggling with the COVID-19 pandemic, uninsured immigrants will have no option but 
to wait for emergent and rapidly deteriorating health conditions before seeking medical care. The estimated cost 
of treating the uninsured who are hospitalized with COVID-19 will range from $13.9 billion to $41.8 billion, 
consuming 40% of the funding set aside for the healthcare industry by the CARES Act. Larry Levitt, Karen 
Schwartz & Eric Lopez, Estimated Cost of Treating the Uninsured Hospitalized with COVID-19, KAISER 
FAMILY FOUND. (Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.kff.org/uninsured/issue-brief/estimated-cost-of-treating-the-
uninsured-hospitalized-with-covid-19/.  
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With the 2019 public charge rule placing restrictions on even eligible 
immigrants, those who are past the five-year bar, from accessing legally entitled 
health programs, the cost to hospitals will be even more exacerbated. By 
penalizing access to federally funded healthcare, the 2019 public charge policy 
ignores the implementation of the five-year bar, making it unappealing for non-
immigrants,210 even when they have satisfied the time limit, to take part in health 
programs designed to protect them and the larger community. Situations that are 
dangerous for the individual immigrant’s health, such as a dialysis patient 
waiting until their condition is critical in order to be dialyzed in the emergency 
room or a cancer patient who does not have insurance waiting to receive 
ambulatory treatments prior to being admitted to the emergency room, are also 
more expensive for the hospital and federal government to treat once the 
patients’ conditions have worsened to the point of requiring life-saving and 
stabilizing care.211 As a result, community health centers and “[s]afety net 
hospitals” are strained by uncompensated costs when patients cannot access, or 
are scared away from, otherwise public insurance programs and healthcare.212 
These extra costs may result in health systems cutting back in other areas to 
break even, such as offering fewer services and even shutting down certain 
hospitals.213  
The restrictions posed by the 2019 public charge rule are detrimental, not 
only to public health but also to the healthcare industry. Projections estimate that 
hospitals alone would lose over $17 billion annually due to a substantial portion 
of Medicaid and CHIP enrollees receiving care from and submitting payments 
to a hospital.214 Safety net providers will be further burdened, especially in 
 
 210 See supra notes 39 and 86. 
 211 PATRICIA ILLINGWORTH & WENDY E. PARMET, THE HEALTH OF NEWCOMERS: IMMIGRATION, HEALTH 
POLICY, AND THE CASE FOR GLOBAL SOLIDARITY 88–96 (2017). 
 212 Parmet, supra note 175, at 223. 
 213 CINDY MANN, APRIL GRADY & ALLISON ORRIS, MEDICAID PAYMENTS AT RISK FOR HOSPITALS UNDER 
THE PUBLIC CHARGE PROPOSED RULE 4 (2018). This concern is exacerbated when healthcare workers, 17% of 
whom were also immigrants in 2016, have to worry about cutbacks to H1 visas and the termination of DACA. 
Szilvia Altorjai & Jeanne Batalova, Immigrant Health-Care Workers in the United States, MIGRATION POL’Y 
INST. (June 28, 2017), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/immigrant-health-care-workers-united-states; 
Casey Ross & Max Blau, US Health Care Relies Heavily on Foreign Workers. Trump’s Immigration Ban Is 
Raising Alarms (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.statnews.com/2017/01/30/trump-immigration-ban-health-
workers/. “Approximately 6 million foreign-born workers are the foot soldiers in our frontline defense against 
COVID-19, employed in ‘essential’ jobs in areas such as health care, grocery stores, agriculture, and the medical 
supply chain.” Covid-19 Highlights the Need to Support Immigrants Now and into the Future, GCIR (May 15, 
2020), https://www.gcir.org/news/covid-19-highlights-need-support-immigrants-now-and-future. 
 214 MANN ET AL., supra note 213, at 5; see also DHS Public Charge Regulation Could Drive Medicaid 
Coverage Losses, MANATT (Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.manatt.com/insights/newsletters/manatt-on-health-
medicaid-edition/dhs-public-charge-regulation-could-drive-medicaid (“Estimates are based on Medicaid 
spending in 2016. Of the estimated $17 billion in hospital payments potentially at risk in 2016, $7 billion was 
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communities with large immigrant populations, as uncompensated care 
increases with the reliance on emergency room services.215 The use of 
emergency medical services is not covered by the feared restrictions on public 
charge, and as such, immigrant families will have a strong incentive to skip 
accessing Medicaid and risk their adjustment of immigration status until a 
medical condition becomes emergent.216 While these pseudo-uninsured patients 
forego preventive and routine care, they will still eventually be forced to turn to 
hospitals for “expensive acute care and inpatient procedures,” consequently 
raising uncompensated care costs for the hospital.217  
The threat to hospitals of losing Medicaid and CHIP patients as a result of 
the public charge policy is severe, best described in a report by Manatt Health 
on behalf of America’s Essential Hospitals, the Association of American 
Medical Colleges, the American Hospital Association, the Catholic Health 
Association of the United States, the Children’s Hospital Association, and the 
Federation of American Hospitals.218 The report projected significant economic 
consequences for hospitals:  
Overall, the public charge proposed rule would have a significant 
negative impact on hospitals and the communities that rely upon them, 
particularly in areas with large immigrant populations. As 
uncompensated care costs rise, the destabilizing impact of the rule 
could threaten the investments hospitals make in serving their entire 
communities.219 
The 2019 rule would also treat even the presence of medical conditions, without 
the coverage of private insurance, as a negative factor in accessing a noncitizen’s 
likelihood of becoming a public charge.220 Immigrants who are uninsured, or 
those who are eligible to receive state health insurance benefits, may opt not to 
visit a physician or take diagnostic tests in order to avoid a medical diagnosis 
that may disqualify them from adjusting to permanent resident status.221  
Additionally, by including non-cash benefits such as SNAP and federal 
housing assistance as factors in determining a public charge, the 2019 rule would 
 
associated with noncitizen enrollees and $10 billion was associated with citizen enrollees who have a noncitizen 
family member.”). 
 215 MANN ET AL., supra note 213, at 20. 
 216 See Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 83 Fed. Reg. 51,114, 51,290 (proposed Oct. 10, 2018) 
(to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 103, 212, 213, 214, 245, and 248). 
 217 MANN ET AL., supra note 213, at 5. 
 218 Id. at 1. 
 219 Id. at 5. 
 220 Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 83 Fed. Reg. at 51,182.  
 221 Parmet, supra note 175, at 230. 
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reduce access to nutrition and housing programs that are positive SDH.222 
Without the support of these non-cash benefits and with the strong incentive to 
allow medical conditions to worsen and thus rely on the emergency room, 
hospitals and other health centers face a significant financial strain from the 
misuse of public charge.223 As a result, National Hospital Associations, 
including those involved in the Manatt Health report, released a joint statement 
requesting the administration withdraw the “harmful” proposal of the 2019 rule 
as soon as it was finalized.224 These hospital associations specifically named the 
restriction of Medicaid, concerned that it would “lead to delays in care” as a 
foreseeable negative impact.225 Lisa David, the President and CEO of Public 
Health Solutions, commented that the weaponization of public charge to restrict 
immigration on the basis of using non-cash benefit programs “is going to cost 
the [healthcare] system a lot of money.”226 Medicaid and CHIP, two non-cash 
benefit programs at risk, are critical to the financial stability of hospitals and 
other healthcare providers, accounting for nearly one out of every five healthcare 
dollars nationwide and paying for a range of care.227 One out of every three 
program dollars allocated to Medicaid and CHIP enrollees are spent exclusively 
on hospital-based care.228 
State governments are the first domino to be hit if health insurance is limited, 
and, as such, fourteen states sued DHS in temporarily successful litigation for 
declaratory and injunctive relief.229 States would lose money they receive from 
 
 222 See B. Cameron Webb & Dayna Bowen Matthew, Housing: A Case for the Medicalization of Poverty, 
46 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 588, 591, 593 (2018); Megan Sandel & Matthew Desmond, Investing in Housing for 
Health Improves Both Mission and Margin, 318 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2291, 2291 (2017); Nancy E. Adler, M. 
Maria Glymour & Jonathan Fielding, Addressing Social Determinants of Health and Health Inequalities, 316 J. 
AM. MED. ASS’N 1641, 1641 (2016). 
 223 For further information on non-cash benefits in the 2019 policy change, see Inadmissibility on Public 
Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 41,292, 41,312 (Aug. 14, 2019). The reliance on emergency services and 
emergent care is uncontested, and DHS notes it as a potential result from the proposed rule. Id. at 41,313. 
 224 Joint Statement from National Hospital Associations on DHS Public Charge Final Rule, AM. HOSP. 
ASS’N (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.aha.org/press-releases/2019-08-12-joint-statement-national-hospital-associations-
dhs-public-charge-final. 
 225 Id.; see Kristalee Guerra, The Policy and Politics of Illegal Immigrant Health Care in Texas, 3 
HOUSTON J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 113 (2002) (including a brief discussion of the economic consequences 
resulting from denying preventive healthcare in states such as California and New York as well as a proposed 
suggestion for Texas). 
 226 In Suit Against New Immigration Rule, California Claims Trump’s ‘Public Charge’ Change 
‘Weaponizes Health Care’, KHN (Aug. 19, 2019), https://khn.org/morning-breakout/in-suit-against-new-
immigration-rule-california-claims-trumps-public-charge-change-weaponizes-health-care/ (quotations omitted). 
 227 MANN ET AL., supra note 213, at 4, 20. This care ranges from routine checkups and prescription drugs 
to hospital stays for serious illnesses. Id. at 20. 
 228 MANN ET AL., supra note 213, at 20. 
 229 Washington v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 408 F. Supp. 3d 1191, 1224 (E.D. Wash. 2019). 
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the federal government for public benefit programs, while simultaneously taking 
on an influx of immigrant patients who would switch from accessing federal 
programs to state programs that would not count against them as public benefits 
under the 2019 rule.230 While PRWORA placed a five-year ban on otherwise 
qualified immigrants, many states have elected to use state funds to cover those 
immigrants during the five-year span.231 The states listed in the suits manage 
and administer healthcare services and Medicaid to their patients, and with the 
threat of reduced enrollment and a dramatic increase to state costs, ensuring that 
public charge does not include non-cash benefit programs is in their direct 
interest and in the interest of private hospitals within the state.232  
Resulting harm also includes a shift of healthcare costs to the states in the 
form of increased emergency and uncompensated care. Uncompensated care 
refers to medical services that are unreimbursed, provided by hospitals to 
patients, and that result in “charity care or bad debts” when the uninsured 
patients are unable to pay their bills.233 The federal government is taking this 
opportunity to once again pass the bill of health insurance to the states.234 
Immigrants will still need to seek medical treatment, but by forcing them to 
present with emergent cases that will not be reimbursed by the federal 
government, states and local hospitals take on the more expensive costs.235  
On a macro level, the massive disenrollment from public assistance 
programs by immigrant families will reduce revenue to hospitals, grocery stores, 
and other providers, thereby significantly and adversely impacting state 
economies.236 Total economic output would be affected by nearly $100 million, 
with economists from Washington’s State Department of Social and Health 
 
 230 Id. at 1204. 
 231 8 U.S.C. § 1622(a) (2018). “Although such state-only health benefits do not constitute ‘public benefits’ 
under the Rule’s public charge test, many noncitizens will fear that enrollment in state-funded programs (which 
often have the same name as the state’s Medicaid program) will carry adverse immigration consequences.” 
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 89, Washington v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 4:19-
cv-05210-RMP (E.D. Wash. Aug. 14, 2019). 
 232 See Washington v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 408 F. Supp. 3d at 1205–06. 
 233 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 101, Washington v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
408 F. Supp. 3d 1191 (E.D. Wash. 2019) (No. 4:19-cv-05210-RMP). 
 234 See THERESE J. MCGUIRE & DAVID F. MERRIMAN, HAS WELFARE REFORM CHANGED STATE 
EXPENDITURE PATTERNS? 1 (2006). In 1996, Congress passed the cost to state and local governments with the 
enactment of PRWORA. Id.  
 235 “Further, because their conditions are more serious, they will require greater resources to treat.” 
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 102, Washington v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 408 F. 
Supp. 3d 1191(E.D. Wash. 2019) (No. 4:19-cv-05210-RMP). 
 236 See Order Granting Plaintiff States’ Motion for Section 705 Stay and Preliminary Injunction at 16–17, 
Washington v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 408 F. Supp. 3d 1191 (E.D. Wash. 2019) (No. 4:19-cv-05210-
RMP). 
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Services placing the economic output affected in the state between $41.8 million 
and $97.5 million, with an annual reduction of wages totaling between $15.7 
million and $36.7 million.237 
Also affected by the federal government’s weaponization of public charge 
are counties, such as Santa Clara County, California, that claim they will incur 
additional costs due to residents shifting toward services paid for and 
administered by counties.238 Santa Clara County, alongside the city and county 
of San Francisco, filed the first lawsuit to halt the proposed rule in August 
2019.239 Local governments face similar fears about which state governments 
complained, arguing that by coercing residents to forego public benefits, new 
changes to public charge policy would increase programmatic and 
administrative costs to the counties’ health and safety net systems.240 In addition, 
the complaint jointly filed by the city and county of San Francisco noted that 
restricting immigrants from accessing public benefits threatens the public health 
and reduces economic activity in the counties.241  
The origin of public charge policy was set out to protect U.S. citizens from 
people who may become a public charge, but instead it is being used to threaten 
the immigrant community at the expense of state and local governments and 
American businesses, namely the healthcare system, similar to the harm caused 
by PRWORA in 1996. As a result, taxpayers, who were intended to be 
financially protected from abuse of public benefit programs,242 end up 
supporting the state and local governments’ excess costs in the emergency room. 
EMTALA is still an unfunded mandate, and the inevitable rise in emergent 
patient care will be shouldered by the private hospitals that are legally required 
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the indirect effect as dollars have a “beneficial economic ripple effect as they circulate in the economy.” Id. 
Economists from the Department of Agriculture determined that “SNAP benefits have a high multiplier effect 
as they circulate through the local economy—every dollar issued to a SNAP recipient results in $1.79 in 
economic activity.” Id. This same ripple effect will be seen from the restriction of Medicaid, and other non-cash 
benefit programs, overall negatively affecting the counties’ economic growth. See id.  
 242 See Trump’s Statement on the 2019 Rule Change, supra note 41. 
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to stabilize patients.243 With hope of only limited reimbursement, healthcare 
institutions may resort to cutting back in services and closing local healthcare 
centers, a substantial cost to taxpayers nationwide.244  
IV. NECESSARY CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 
Congress has excluded most noncitizens—specifically those who are 
undocumented, visiting the country on student or tourist visas, or green-card 
holders who have not reached the five-year bar—from receiving government-
funded healthcare as a critical part of the welfare reform legislation passed in 
1996.245 Arguably, Congress may desire to support the intimidation of the 
immigrant community with the 2019 policy in line with its prior action to restrict 
accessibility to healthcare. However, there are considerable benefits of revising 
the public charge statute to exclude consideration of accessing public health 
benefits. This Comment is not arguing for an expansion of coverage to all 
noncitizens by amending PRWORA, it is simply advocating for a strategic 
update to the public charge statute. While such a revision is not radical and the 
immigrant population directly affected is less than 500,000 individuals—who 
are already legally within the United States and seeking to adjust their residency 
status—it is significant as it will sufficiently address specific concerns raised by 
healthcare organizations, state and local governments, and immigrant families 
following the proposal of the 2019 public charge rule. This Part first discusses 
why review of the public charge statute is long overdue before moving on to 
prescribe an exact and limited revision to the public charge statute of 1952. The 
revision proposed in this Part ensures the status quo remains in line with 
PRWORA by protecting the immigrant community eligible for public health 
benefits without expanding those benefits to noncitizens who were originally 
excluded by welfare reform.  
A. Long Overdue Public Charge Review 
Public charge policy has evolved over the development of this nation, and 
Congress has not revisited the statute since the passage of the INA in 1952,246 
thus allowing the executive branch to direct the policy. Congressional action 
indirectly conflated the standards of public charge with the passage of welfare 
reform, and agency guidance served to clarify procedure without any modern 
 
 243 Lee Black, Defining Hospitals’ Obligation to Stabilize Patients Under EMTALA, 8 AMA J. ETHICS 
752, 752 (2006). 
 244 MANN ET AL., supra note 213, at 4. 
 245 See supra Part II.D.1. 
 246 See USCIS Policy Manual, supra note 39, at Chapter 1.B.2. 
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legislation to guide it.247 Although objections to the 2019 rule highlight the 
consistent, decades-old policy development that has formed modern public 
charge, congressional intent can only be detected from action taken regarding 
the flow of immigration or access to public benefits separately, instead of 
comprehensive legislation addressing the clear impact on both.  
Plaintiffs opposing the 2019 public charge rule noted the rule’s dismissal of 
INS regulation from 1999 and congressional intent in making Medicaid and 
other non-cash benefit programs accessible to noncitizens after they meet certain 
eligibility requirements. PRWORA allowed qualified immigrants to apply for 
and utilize public benefits after five years, but the 2019 rule “eviscerates 
Congress’s intent by imposing an effective ‘bait and switch’—punishing 
immigrants for using public benefits for which Congress itself made them 
eligible.”248 The executive branch is readily abusing its discretion by 
implementing such a drastic shift in policy. While courts continue to litigate over 
the assault on immigrants’ access to non-cash public benefits, congressional 
action is needed to ensure its stability.  
There is a greater need for a new public charge statute than ever before, 
because the society welcoming and supporting immigrants is entirely different 
now. The level of government assistance for which noncitizens are eligible after 
the rise of the welfare state, even with the reform in 1996, reflects a society 
vastly different than in 1952.249 In this welfare state, federally funded healthcare 
programs are offered to eligible immigrants, and these immigrants are legally 
entitled to access healthcare, save for restrictions placed on them by encroaching 
immigration policy.250 Public charge takes on a whole new meaning with the 
vast availability of federal health programs, especially compared to its 
conceptualization in the nineteenth and early twentieth century.  
The last time Congress indirectly questioned the zone of public charge policy 
was the passage of PRWORA. Welfare reform was passed with overwhelming 
support by the Republican party.251 In the confusion arising from the language 
 
 247 See Order Granting Plaintiff States’ Motion for Section 705 Stay and Preliminary Injunction at 40–41, 
43–44, Washington v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 408 F. Supp. 3d 1191 (E.D. Wash. 2019) (No. 4:19-cv-
05210-RMP). 
 248 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 4, Washington v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 408 
F. Supp. 3d 1191 (E.D. Wash. 2019) (No. 4:19-cv-05210-RMP). 
 249 See generally Robert A. Moffitt, The Deserving Poor, the Family, and the U.S. Welfare System, 52 
DEMOGRAPHY 729 (2015) (discussing the changes of the welfare state throughout the late 1900s and early 
2000s). 
 250 SONAL AMBEGAOKAR, OPPORTUNITIES FOR MAXIMIZING REVENUE AND ACCESS TO CARE FOR 
IMMIGRANT POPULATIONS 2–5 (n.d.). 
 251 The final votes on the Conference Agreement passed in July of 1996 were 328 voting yes in the House 
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of the law, the field guidance published by INS directly addressed the definition 
of public charge to clarify that it continued along the historic understanding that 
a “charge” on the government reflected “a person . . . committed or entrusted to 
the care, custody, management, or support” of the government.252 Further, it did 
not include the receipt of non-cash public benefits that were instead considered 
“supplemental [by] nature.”253 In the three-year period between the passage of 
PRWORA and the adoption of the field guidance, Congress had ample time to 
clarify the disconnect and establish clear standards for the use of non-cash public 
benefits, namely Medicaid. However, congressional inaction was interpreted as 
acceptance of the INS field guidance, and the public charge statute was not 
adjusted in the late 1990s as it should have been.254  
Without congressional action, the executive branch is free to abuse its 
discretion by changing the field guidance DHS put in place in 1999,255 which 
the Trump Administration has been successful in doing. Without any 
congressional action in response to the field guidance from 1999, executive 
discretion to alter the public charge statute now is no different than before. The 
executive branch is advocating that Congress clearly intended to restrict 
noncitizens from “[depending] on public resources to meet their needs”256 as a 
way to justify the stark misstep with its 2019 rule. However, this rule is the prime 
example of how much power the executive branch is amassing regarding 
immigration policy. Although Congress has the power to govern immigration 
and access to federal benefits,257 it has not fulfilled its responsibility to govern 
 
of Representatives and 78 voting yes in the Senate. Social Security: Vote Tallies, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., https:// 
www.ssa.gov/history/tally1996.html (last visited May 25, 2020). Of these votes, Democrats split 98 to 97 in the 
House of Representatives and 25 to 21 in the Senate, with two and one members abstaining, respectively. Id. 
 252 Inadmissibility and Deportability on Public Charge Grounds, 64 Fed. Reg. 28,676, 28,677 (proposed 
May 26, 1999) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 212 and 237). 
 253 Id. at 28,677–78, 28,682, 28,685–86.  
 254 See Motion for Leave to File Amicus Brief at 9, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. New York, No. 
19A785 (U.S. 2020). 
 255 The underlying litigation challenging the 2019 public charge policy argues the rule change is invalid 
under the Administrative Procedure Act. See City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. 
Servs., 408 F. Supp. 3d 1057, 1074 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (discussing the administrative law implications of the 
executive agency’s actions); see also Laura Wamsley, Pam Fessler & Richard Gonzales, Federal Judges in 3 
States Block Trump’s ‘Public Charge’ Rule for Green Cards, NPR (Oct. 11, 2019, 2:56 PM), https://www.npr. 
org/2019/10/11/769376154/n-y-judge-blocks-trump-administrations-public-charge-rule. 
 256 See Trump’s Statement on the 2019 Rule Change, supra note 41. 
 257 Congress established the current laws governing immigration and public benefits in 1996 with 
PRWORA and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). See Field Guidance 
on Deportability and Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 64 Fed. Reg. 28,689, 28,689 (Mar. 26, 1999). 
See generally City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 408 F. Supp. 3d 1057, 1097 
(N.D. Cal. 2019) (describing the impact of Congressional revisions to immigration and access to federal benefits 
in the IIRIRA and PRWORA, respectively). 
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the public charge doctrine by providing a reasonable definition and detailed 
standards.  
B. Revisiting and Revising the Public Charge Statute 
The natural next step is for Congress to revisit and revise the public charge 
statute, especially regarding the use of Medicaid. If anything has become clear 
from the past decade of scholarly research, anecdotal data collection, and 
reporting and objections from various healthcare entities, it is that the 
government has received overwhelming and compelling evidence that 
healthcare should not enter into public charge considerations. Congress must 
amend the statute and direct executive agencies on how to consider public charge 
reliance and to explicitly exclude medical diagnoses and expenses for which 
immigrants are otherwise eligible. The government and American taxpayers do 
not benefit from dissuading noncitizens from using healthcare.258 Congress 
should revisit and revise the public charge statute, last addressed in 1952, to 
clarify that any health benefits legally entitled to immigrants will not be counted 
against them in public charge analysis, permanently halting the threat 
implemented by the 2019 rule. Revising the public charge statute to exclude 
consideration of health benefits will not be an expansion of eligibility because 
Congress has already legislated a framework for immigrants to access Medicaid 
and other non-cash benefits under PRWORA. 
First, Congress needs to reconsider the benefits to public health when it 
excludes public health benefits from public charge. With the passage of 
PRWORA, and with the feared consequences of changing DHS’ standards 
regarding public charge, public health has been continually placed on the 
chopping block. Scholars have fiercely advocated on behalf of preserving public 
health and warned against the danger of limiting access to publicly subsidized 
healthcare for any group of people within the United States.259 By ensuring that 
noncitizens have access to public health benefits, Congress will limit the spread 
of communicable diseases that can more easily be contained by the intentional 
coverage of as many people within the United States as possible.260 Additionally, 
 
 258 See Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 2, New York v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., No. 1:19-cv-07777-GBD (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2019); Washington v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland 
Sec., 408 F. Supp. 3d 1191, 1204 (E.D. Wash. 2019); City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. U.S. Citizenship & 
Immigr. Servs., 408 F. Supp. 3d 1057, 1074 (N.D. Cal. 2019); Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief 
at 1–2, La Clinica de la Raza v. Trump, No. 3:19-cv-4980 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2019); Preliminary Injunction 
Order at 4, California v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 19-cv-04975-PJH (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2019). 
 259 See Price, supra note 101, at 248; Makhlouf, supra note 5, at 178; Parmet, supra note 167, at 216, 218. 
 260 See Price, supra note 101, at 237 (stating that public charge doctrine “could lead to . . . increased 
prevalence of communicable diseases, including among members of the U.S. citizen population”) (citation 
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Congress will address the chilling effects from dissuading use of important 
public benefits, such as “increases in maternal mortality, premature birth, low 
birth weight, behavioral and emotional problems among children, mental health 
issues, metabolism-related illnesses, and inflammatory diseases like arthritis.”261 
The families of immigrant parents, many of whom are citizens, will also benefit 
from the inclusion of the heads of household into health coverage: increases in 
parental coverage are “associated with increases in pediatric primary care.”262 
By addressing the negative health outcomes that are expected to cause 
disproportionate harm to people of color and exacerbate already existing 
disparities, Congress will ensure the communities most at risk from a disrupted 
public health system are covered.  
Second, Congress needs to reconsider the significant financial impact that 
will be avoided when it excludes public health benefits from public charge. State 
and local governments, health systems and providers, and indirectly the 
American taxpayer will benefit from the strategic exclusion of accessing of 
Medicaid and federal health programs from consideration in public charge 
decisions.263 By ensuring that state and local governments receive federal 
funding for Medicaid, Congress will streamline the efficiency of receiving 
health benefits and support these systems in protecting the public health. As long 
as Congress continues not to guarantee that qualified noncitizens have access to 
public health insurance, states and counties are at risk of the shifting burden of 
cost to provide adequate public health benefits.264 Congress will bolster state and 
local economies and protect them from the loss of jobs, revenue, and healthcare 
business inevitably cascading from the restriction of non-cash federal public 
 
omitted). 
 261 Makhlouf, supra note 5, at 199.  
 262 Maya Venkataramani, Craig Evan Pollock & Eric T. Roberts, Spillover Effect of Adult Medicaid 
Expansion on Children’s Use of Preventive Services, 140 PEDIATRICS 1, 6 (2017). On the other hand, if Congress 
does not act, “children will feel the effects if their parents lose access to health coverage and forgo medical care.” 
Parmet, supra note 175, at 230. Children born in the United States will also be impacted if their parents avoid 
using other non-cash benefits, such as SNAP or housing subsidies. Id. (“Food and housing, after all, affect 
everyone in a household. In addition, the health of households affects the health of their communities. When 
children can’t go to school because they or their parents are sick, when workers can’t be productive because 
they’re forgoing basic health care, communities as a whole suffer.”). 
 263 See Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 2, New York v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., No. 1:19-cv-07777-GBD (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2019); Washington v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland 
Sec., 408 F. Supp. 3d 1191, 1204 (E.D. Wash. 2019); City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. U.S. Citizenship & 
Immigr. Servs., 408 F. Supp. 3d 1057, 1074 (N.D. Cal. 2019); Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief 
at 1–2, La Clinica de la Raza v. Trump, No. 3:19-cv-04980 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2019); Preliminary Injunction 
Order, California v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 19-cv-04975-PJH (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2019). 
 264 Order Granting Plaintiff States’ Motion for Section 705 Stay and Preliminary Injunction at 16–17, 
Washington v. U.S. Dep’t Homeland Sec., 408 F. Supp. 3d 1191 (E.D. Wash. 2019) (No. 4:19-cv-05210-RMP). 
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health benefits.265 Considering the unfunded mandate that requires hospitals and 
emergency departments to examine and stabilize patients with emergent medical 
conditions,266 Congress is strongly encouraged to provide federal funding to 
lower those costs and support health efforts to treat medical conditions early and 
preventively,267 for the good of the individual patient and the community’s 
public health.  
As the financial consequences of public charge expansion become more 
widely known, healthcare institutions will continue to advocate for coverage of 
public health benefits by the federal government. Without this coverage, these 
institutions are not only at risk for losing Medicaid revenue and paying the 
higher, uncompensated cost of emergency care, but they will also shoulder the 
burden of a rise in communicable diseases.268 The federal government claims to 
financially benefit from the limitation on federally funded public health 
programs; however, the cost is still a burden on the taxpayer because the 
responsibility is simply shifted to state and local governments, and the 
noncitizens within the United States will still need to access certain state benefits 
and those programs will become overwhelmed by the influx. Congress can 
prevent this strain on the healthcare system and additional unforeseen financial 
consequences to all affected providers from a massive cut to publicly subsidized 
healthcare. 
Revising the public charge statute is relatively simple, as the governing law 
was enacted by Congress in the INA and was codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1182: 
4) Public charge 
(A) In general 
Any alien who, in the opinion of the consular officer at the time 
of application for a visa, or in the opinion of the Attorney 
General at the time of application for admission or adjustment 
of status, is likely at any time to become a public charge is 
inadmissible. 
(B) Factors to be taken into account 
(i) In determining whether an alien is 
 
 265 As noted earlier, the state of Washington’s economic output could be affected up to $97.5 million 
annually. Washington v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 408 F. Supp. 3d 1191, 1208 (E.D. Wash. 2019). 
 266 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395ccc, 1395ddd (2012). 
 267 See Joint Statement from National Hospital Associations on DHS Public Charge Final Rule, AM. HOSP. 
ASS’N (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.aha.org/press-releases/2019-08-12-joint-statement-national-hospital-associations-
dhs-public-charge-final. 
 268 Order Granting Plaintiff States’ Motion for Section 705 Stay and Preliminary Injunction at 52, 
Washington v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 408 F. Supp. 3d 1191 (E.D. Wash. 2019) (No. 4:19-cv-05210-
RMP). 
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inadmissible under this paragraph, the consular 
officer or the Attorney General shall at a 
minimum consider the alien’s- 
(I)  age; 
(II)  health; 
(III)  family status; 
(IV)  assets, resources, and financial status; and 
(V)  education and skills.269 
DHS’s final rule on inadmissibility on public charge grounds builds on these 
factors and greatly raises the bar for inadmissibility by including accessing the 
public benefit of federal health programs as a negative factor in considering an 
immigrant’s “assets, resources, and financial status” for inadmissibility 
purposes.270 The most effective way to curb the public health consequences and 
increased financial burden caused by the 2019 policy is for Congress to revise 
this language of the statute to include a limitation on the public benefits 
accessed. Congress should adopt the following language: 
(iii) In determining whether an alien is inadmissible under this 
paragraph, the consular officer or the Attorney General shall exclude 
from consideration the alien’s accessing of health benefits to which 
they are legally entitled.  
With a short and simple revision, Congress can effectively stabilize the 
confusion and fear borne from the 2019 public charge policy, save states and the 
healthcare industry considerable revenue from Medicaid and temper the rise of 
emergency room visits, and address the public health concerns scholars have 
been warning about for decades.271 The addition of one sentence will allow 
immigrants who can legally access Medicaid and CHIP to utilize these non-cash 
benefit programs without restriction and without allowing the use of these 
programs to count negatively toward their immigration applications. 
Congressional action will be slight, yet powerful, and it would ensure that any 
threat to legally entitled health benefits will no longer arise at the whim of 
executive agencies. Rather, it will be voted on by the legislative branch to be in 
line with welfare reform agreed upon and passed decades ago. 
 
 269 Id. 
 270 Id. 
 271 See Michael D. Iseman & Jeffrey Starke, Immigrants and Tuberculosis Control, 332 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1094 (1995) (studying possible rise in tuberculosis); Tal A. Ziv & Bernard Lo, Denial of Care to Illegal 
Immigrants: Proposition 187 in California, 332 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1095, 1096–97 (1995) (describing public 
health concerns raised by Proposition 187).  
DAUDIPROOFS_9.30.20 9/30/2020 12:13 PM 
246 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:201 
The federal government has already acknowledged the importance of 
intentionally allowing access to some healthcare services without penalty, as 
they are also crucial to the well-being of society: emergency medical services,272 
services and benefits provided under the Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Act (IDEA),273 and pregnant noncitizens over the age of twenty-one can 
continue to access Medicaid without penalty.274 DHS acknowledges that 
“preservation of life from an immediate threat is an important policy 
consideration,” but leaves the determination of whether a condition is 
“emergent” to the state, outlining the case law that expanded the definition of 
“emergent.”275 These carve-outs have been established by the decades of policy 
governing public charge to date, and they have not been threatened by any 
federal or agency action, although the applicability of emergency medical 
services is still being governed by state case law. Revisiting the public charge 
statute and setting a clear policy that medical services will not be part of public 
charge consideration will defend against the further encroachment on public 
programs for noncitizens.  
Protecting noncitizen communities and ensuring their access to Medicaid 
and CHIP is a moral imperative. Without these programs, noncitizens will have 
no choice but to allow their dangerous medical conditions to fester and 
ultimately risk their lives in an attempt to meet the ever-harshening criteria to 
become a lawful citizen of this country. Early public charge cases recognized 
that allowing access to public benefits better integrates noncitizens in the 
country;276 this access gives them a fighting chance to build a life alongside 
community members who are able to access legally entitled health benefits 
without fear of penalties on their immigration applications. 
Congress clearly intended to allow health services to be covered under 
PRWORA for eligible immigrants,277 and in the same vein, Congress can 
 
 272 See supra Part I.  
 273 See 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2004).  
 274 KAISER FAMILY FOUND., CHANGES TO “PUBLIC CHARGE” INADMISSIBILITY RULE: IMPLICATIONS FOR 
HEALTH AND HEALTH COVERAGE 6 (2019). 
 275 Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 83 Fed. Reg. 51,114, 51,169 (proposed Oct. 10, 2018) (to 
be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 103, 212, 213, 214, 245, and 248). DHS considers medical services received after a 
car accident to be emergent but did not answer whether treatment for leukemia that had reached a “crisis stage” 
would be considered necessary to preserve life from an immediate threat. Id. (citing Szewczyk v. Dep’t of Soc. 
Servs., 881 A.2d 259, 273 (Conn. 2005)). 
 276 See The Public Charge Rule, Explained, supra note 32; but see Trump’s Statement on the 2019 Rule 
Change, supra note 41 (arguing that allowing noncitizens to access public benefits is a drain on federal 
resources).  
 277 Health services were also covered under the IIRIRA of 1996. See Field Guidance on Deportability and 
Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 64 Fed. Reg. 28,689, 28,689 (Mar. 26, 1999). In a revision of public 
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legislate the exclusion of accessing these health benefits from public charge 
considerations in immigration. The potential for misuse and weaponization of 
public charge will persist as long as the statute from 1952 is not rectified by 
congressional action; until then, the executive branch will wield authoritative 
power and control the practice of public charge exclusion unchecked by 
legislation. Relying on judicial intervention is not a strong, permanent solution: 
the legislative branch is entrusted to establish parameters for the provision of 
federal public health programs, and the responsibility has been shirked, instead 
allowing DHS to outline guidance that will continue to misconstrue 
congressional intent to the benefit of the political whims of the executive.  
CONCLUSION 
Key findings from the Pew Research Center note the growth in immigration 
to the United States:  
The U.S. foreign-born population reached a record 44.4 million in 
2017. Since 1965, when U.S. immigration laws replaced a national 
quota system, the number of immigrants living in the U.S. has more 
than quadrupled. Immigrants today account for 13.6% of the U.S. 
population, nearly triple the share (4.7%) in 1970.278 
 
charge, there is a unique opportunity to readdress the dangers posed by PRWORA as well. The five-year bar 
established for qualified immigrants sets an unreasonable standard, and the risks to public health and the costs 
to state governments have been well-documented and analyzed. Wendy E. Parmet, Who’s In?: Immigrants and 
Healthcare, OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTH 1033, 1041, 1046 (I. Glenn Cohen, Allison K. Hoffman & 
William M. Sage eds., 2017) (criticizing the exclusions under PRWORA); see also Polly J. Price, Sovereignty, 
Citizenship and Public Health in the United States, 17 N.Y.U. J. LEG. PUB. POL’Y 919, 919 (2014) (“[A] 
fragmented public health infrastructure mean[s] that the cost of health control measures falls on state and local 
governments[.]”). By disallowing unqualified immigrants, such as undocumented noncitizens and visitors, from 
utilizing Medicaid and CHIP in 1996, Congress introduced the first drastic limitation on welfare for noncitizens. 
Tanya Broder, Avideh Moussavian & Jonathan Blazer, Overview of Immigrant Eligibility for Federal Programs, 
NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR., https://www.nilc.org/issues/economic-support/overview-immeligfedprograms/ (last 
updated Dec. 2015). This intended reform was met with significant opposition, and it was feared that any 
encroachment on public health services would endanger the community and further ostracize immigrants 
entering the country. Audrey Singer, Immigrants, Welfare Reform and the Coming Reauthorization Vote, 
MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Aug. 1, 2002), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/immigrants-welfare-reform-
and-coming-reauthorization-vote. As expected, the encroachment on immigrant rights continues. The executive 
branch heavily relies on the passage of PRWORA and IIRIRA as precedent for the 2019 public charge rule, and 
as long as restrictions on immigrants accessing public health services are encouraged in this country’s legislation, 
the fight over health insurance for noncitizens will not abate. 
 278 Jynnah Radford, Key Findings About U.S. Immigrants, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 17, 2019), https:// 
www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/17/key-findings-about-u-s-immigrants/ (citing Selected U.S. 
Immigration Legislation and Executive Actions, 1790–2014, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Sep. 28, 2015), https://www. 
pewresearch.org/hispanic/2015/09/28/selected-u-s-immigration-legislation-and-executive-actions-1790-2014/). 
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In reality, the 2019 public charge policy will negatively affect only 382,000 
immigrants,279 some of whom will be taken off the chopping block if Congress 
decides to revisit the public charge statute. Although the implicated immigrants 
account for only a small percentage of the U.S. immigrant population, the 
rippling consequences of excluding a few hundred thousand immigrants from 
accessing legally entitled health benefits are disastrous. The fear gripping the 
immigrant community in the days leading up to the implementation of the 2019 
policy was tangible; the confusion that leads families to pick between two 
necessities, their green cards or healthcare, asks an impossible question and 
scares people who are not affected by the rule change into shying away from 
accessing all public benefits. Congressional action to revise public charge will 
address considerable public health concerns raised by limiting healthcare access 
to the most vulnerable communities in the country and ensure all the people 
seeking to build a life in this country are able to do so safely. Congress should 
own the responsibility of legislating the public charge rule, and in doing so will 
also save states the cost incurred from a loss of public benefit program funding 
and an increase in uncompensated and emergent care. Congress will promote the 
financial stability of the healthcare industry, locking in a strong 17% of the 
economy,280 by giving healthcare centers the continued support of non-cash 
benefit programs, such as Medicaid and CHIP.  
With renewed unpenalized access to these programs, immigrants will not 
wait to be treated as their condition worsens in the emergency room, 
consequently saving hospitals and other health centers significant financial 
strain from the misuse of public charge. Although the directly affected 
population is less than substantial, the threat posed to them is significant and can 
be rightfully avoided with direct and strong action by Congress. Revisiting and 
revising the public charge statute may not stop at the exclusion of healthcare 
programs for consideration; this Comment does not address the many further 
steps that can be taken to modernize half-century old legislation, yet it does open 
  
 
 279 Hajela, supra note 9. 
 280 National Health Expenditure Data, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/ 
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the door for the federal government to take a much closer and more intentional 
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